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ABSTRACT 
This thesis utilized a Delphi survey method to obtain the perspective of seasoned 
Incident Commanders (ICs), as they reflected on their experience responding to 
surge incidents. Surge events are defined as complex and chaotic emergencies 
that require resources well beyond normal operating capacity. These surge 
events are rare and of such a magnitude that the Incident Commander is 
confronted with a unique situation that often exceeds his/her experience and 
ability to improvise and adapt to changing conditions. 
 This thesis combines the pertinent literature on decision making, 
situational awareness, collaboration and geospatial technology with the lens of 
experience provided by the Delphi panel. First, this research identifies and 
prioritizes 18 signals that an incident is becoming nonroutine, unfamiliar and 
chaotic. Second, it provides an inventory of strategic options that an Incident 
Commander can consider when faced with the chaos that often accompanies a 
surge event. Finally, this material was synthesized into a quick action guide as a 
reference source that can inform Incident Commanders, as they face the 
dynamic and unpredictable environment of surge events. The knowledge 
obtained through this research is offered with the desire to enhance the ability of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As an emergency incident develops, command structures are formulated 
to direct resources. During routine events, experience, intuition, patterns and 
cues are utilized to make strategic decisions. When formulating an operational 
plan during routine events, the majority of Incident Commanders (ICs) use 
perception, comprehension and projection to identify the potential ramifications of 
the unstable situation. Surge events are defined as complex and chaotic 
emergency incidents that require resources well beyond normal operating 
capacity. These surge events are rare, and of such a magnitude, that the Incident 
Commander is confronted with a unique situation that often exceeds his/her 
experience and ability to improvise and adapt to changing conditions. 
This thesis utilizes a Delphi survey methodology to obtain the perspective 
of experienced Incident Commanders to determine the signals that an incident is 
becoming nonroutine and unfamiliar, inventory decision-making methods during 
unfamiliar events and identify strategies that have the potential to enhance 
decision making. This thesis identifies best practices and inventories strategic 
options that can assist Incident Commanders, as they are faced with fast-moving, 
unpredictable and ever-changing crisis situations. The knowledge obtained 
through this research is offered with a desire to enhance the ability of Incident 
Commanders to make effective decisions when lives are most at risk. 
Decision making during emergency operations relies on both situational 
and personal factors. On the personal level, experience, patterns and cues form 
the basis for decision making. Situational factors include the extent of situational 
awareness, resource availability, command capability and the capacity for 
collaboration. In this context, the seasoned Chief Fire Officer (CFO), who has 
demonstrated exceptional knowledge, skill and ability when faced with  routine 
situations, can transition to a novice when faced with unfamiliar incidents that 
often exist in the chaotic context. This project identified 18 themes that signal the 
transition from the routine toward the unfamiliar. These themes can inform ICs 
 xviii 
that an incident is becoming emergent and produce an anticipatory strategy that 
has the potential to harness this higher level of situational awareness and 
produce and more effective response effort. 
A variety of strategies to deal with the unexpected exist. This thesis 
created an inventory of possible strategies that can broaden the preparatory and 
response based options of ICs. The Delphi survey process indicated that 
responders have a high receptivity to adopting concepts that they have not 
previously utilized.  
 xix 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As an emergency incident develops, command structures formulate to 
effectively and efficiently direct resources. During events that responders deal 
with on a regular basis, experience, patterns and cues are utilized to make 
strategic decisions that will produce an appropriate response capability, thus, 
minimizing the impact of the event and the cost of response. When formulating 
an operational plan during routine events, the majority of Incident Commanders 
function as experts and use perception, comprehension and projection to identify 
the potential ramifications of the unstable situation.1  In the absence of familiar 
patterns and cues, experienced Chief Fire Officers (CFOs) employ analysis to 
recognize that something is wrong and transition toward defensive options that 
emphasize operational sustainability and safety.2 
Experts3 use experience to sift through available information, disregard 
irrelevant information and focus on the key data points that matter. Gladwell 
notes that this process is assisted by the unconscious mind through both rapid 
cognition and intuitive repulsion.4  Rapid cognition is the ability to rapidly 
recognize patterns and cues inherent to ones experience while intuitive repulsion 
is the ability to quickly recognize that something is not right. Using these 
concepts, experience is a valuable tool that can provide context to a situation. 
                                            
1 Roberta Calderwood, Beth W. Crandall, and Gary A. Klein, Expert and Novice Fire Ground 
Command Decisions (Yellow Springs, OH: Klein Associates, Inc., 1987). 
2 Gary A. Klein, "A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision-making," in 
Decision-making in Action: Models and Methods, ed. Gary A. Klein (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Pub., 
1993), 139. 
3 Expert–for the purpose of this thesis, an expert is defined as a experienced fire officer who 
has a comprehensive and authoritative knowledge, ability and skill within the realm of emergency 
response and incident command. These professionals think and reflect on past experience as a 
basis for decision-making. 
4 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. New York: Little, Brown 
and Company, 2005, 8, 119. 
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Surge events are defined as complex and chaotic emergency incidents 
that require resources well beyond normal operating capacity. Examples of surge 
events include: accidents involving a large number of patients; the release of 
significant quantities of hazardous materials; incidents involving exponential fire 
spread; natural disasters and terrorism-related events. In these novel situations, 
the event progresses beyond the normal operating capacity of the host 
community and expands into a multi-agency response that typically 
encompasses the use of three levels of mutual aid as listed below: 
• Tier One - Mutual aid from neighboring communities that is utilized 
on a frequent basis; 
• Tier Two - Regional mutual aid from adjacent areas; 
• Tier Three - Activation of formal statewide mobilization plans. 
These surge events are rare and are of such magnitude that the Incident 
Commander is confronted with a unique situation that often exceeds his/her 
experience and ability to improvise and adapt to changing conditions. The 
absence of patterns and cues creates an unfamiliar operational environment and 
challenges the knowledge, skill and ability of the IC.5  This uncertainty produces 
a high stress operational environment marked by incomplete information, the 
presence of significant external influences, such as the media, time pressure, 
and life safety concerns. Although these events are unique, there are certain 
signals and strategic options that are common and are identified to help the IC 
optimize a strategy to address the wicked problems created by these asymmetric 
events. 
Disorder, confusion and numerous high priority decision points that 
demand the ICs immediate attention often mark the transitional period from the 
routine to the unfamiliar. Secondary to the transition from a complex to a chaotic 
situation, all but the most experienced and adaptive fire service leaders have the 
potential to become overwhelmed and they often revert to applying familiar 
                                            
5 Klein, Recognition-Primed, 139. 
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tactics to unfamiliar situations. These rare events produce a high consequence 
condition that often signals a significant deterioration in decision making. 
Thankfully, large-scale disasters occur relatively infrequently.  
Local public safety leaders are tasked with managing these infrequent 
situations; yet, they often lack a sufficient level of experience that could guide 
effective decision making. When faced with unexpected situations, novices tend 
to react to the unfamiliar while an expert would think and reflect upon experience 
as a guide to effective decision making.6  Typically, a novice makes reactionary 
decisions based upon values, upbringing and the evaluation of strategic options 
that return to the familiar. These reactive actions may not be appropriate to the 
situation. Driving a car can serve as a comparative example. As a driver 
develops skill and experience, he/she transitions from a reactive posture of a 
novice to an anticipatory posture of defensive driving. However, even a seasoned 
driver would once again be a novice, if he/she were thrust into the driver’s seat of 
a racecar. 
As an example of an Incident Commander’s struggle to identify the 
unfamiliar, on June 18, 2007, a rapidly growing fire consumed a furniture store in 
Charleston, South Carolina. During this event, first arriving crews entered the 
structure for the purpose of rescue and fire suppression. As the IC arrived on the 
scene, he did not identify the unfamiliar and recognize that the fuel load7 in the 
structure offered a potential for disaster. Missing this sign of danger, routine 
operations continued and tragedy quickly ensued as a fast moving fire propelled 
by the fuel load of stored furniture killed nine of the first arriving firefighters. In 
this situation, the Incident Commander, who was clearly an expert fire officer, 
became a novice when dealing with an unfamiliar situation that posed an 
immediate danger to firefighters operating within the structure.  
                                            
6 Calderwood, Crandall, and Klein, Expert and Novice Fire Ground Command Decisions. 
7 Fuel load— the total amount of combustible material in the defined space surrounding a 
fire. A high fuel load will produce rapid combustion, intense fire spread, and high heat and smoke 
production. 
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There may be ways to help Incident Commanders operate more 
effectively and efficiently in unfamiliar situations. The development of 
collaborative teams provides an opportunity to build upon collective wisdom, 
develop enhanced situational awareness and dissect the problem at hand.8  
Barriers often exist to the development and rapid deployment of these teams 
based on social aspects ranging from organizational culture to groupthink and 
tribalism. Developing collaborative solutions remains both a social and technical 
challenge that has eluded resolution in many jurisdictions. 
A review of pertinent literature reveals that a wide variety of factors 
influence the period of transition from the routine to the unfamiliar and contribute 
to the overall success of response efforts, and ultimately to the maximization of 
public value. These factors can include; social identity, personality, relationships, 
independence, collaboration, previous experience, skill level, communication 
capability, technology, situational awareness, and organizational culture. This 
thesis examines the symptoms, patterns and cues that mark the transition from 
the complex context toward the danger of the chaotic and unfamiliar. This 
research is directed toward the development of innovative strategic options to 
enhance the depth and adaptive nature of incident command structures in the 
face of chaotic and uncertain situations. 
In an effort to investigate this topic properly, respected practitioners were 
engaged to identify the signs of impending transition and examine potential 
change in decision-making strategies as leaders face the unfamiliar. Through this 
process, critical success factors were identified, and opportunities considered for 
application of these concepts to enhance decision making during the 
transformative period of incident escalation. 
                                            
8 Abdo Nahmod, "The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS in New York 
City: A Focus on the First Line Officer" (Master of Arts in Security Studies (Homeland Security 
and Defense), Naval Postgraduate School). 
 5 
B. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to improve the understanding of decision-
making processes during the initial response to surge incidents and to assist 
Incident Commanders in the rapid identification of surge events that often 
transition toward the chaotic context. This study explores the challenges of 
decision making during the fast paced, confusing and ever-changing environment 
of surge incidents. Experienced CFOs were surveyed in an effort to identify 
signals that an event is becoming nonroutine and unfamiliar and to identify best 
practices for decision making during these fluid and often overwhelming 
situations. The data gathered through this study identifies strategies to enhance 
decision making during the initial operational period of these rare but potentially 
dangerous crises.  
Through a three-tiered process of probing the knowledge and experiences 
of survey participants, this research describes the signals that an event is 
becoming unfamiliar and identifies strategic options for enhancing decision-
making methodologies and capacity. Identifying the signals that an event is 
escalating toward the unfamiliar provides the opportunity for Incident 
Commanders to gain an added level of intuitive thinking. These identified best 
practices offer an IC strategies to increase operational performance and avoid 
potentially tragic outcomes. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOLOGY 
The goal of this research is to provide Incident Commanders with tools 
that can assist them in enhancing decision making during the initial operational 
period of surge events. 
The two primary research questions are:  
1. As emergency incidents expand toward the chaotic context, 
what symptoms, patterns and cues exist to indicate that a 
different method of decision making is necessary? 
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2. What strategies can be utilized to enhance decision making 
during the initial response to chaotic surge incidents?   
This study uses a Delphi survey to elicit responses from CFOs who are 
either graduates of the National Fire Academies (NFA) Executive Fire Officer 
Program (EFOP) or participants in the Massachusetts Fire Incident Reporting 
System (MFIRS). The Delphi survey included both quantitative and qualitative 
questions. Quantitative questions sought the identification of statistical 
information and rated the importance of signals and the frequency of command 
staff assignments. Qualitative questions included requests to identify important 
signals, inventoried adaptive strategies and consider options to manage 
information. Survey data was analyzed and summarized to address each of the 
research questions listed above. Details on the methodology employed follow in 
subsequent chapters. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter I of this thesis introduces the research topic and provides the 
reader with context. Chapter II presents a literature review of decision making 
during crises, situational awareness, and collaboration. Chapter III provides a 
comparative analysis of incident management procedures between the United 
States and Germany. Chapters IV through VI detail the methodology and results 
of the three-tiered Delphi Survey collected from a sample of CFOs. Chapter VII 
presents thesis findings, recommendations to enhancing decision making, and 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A methodical review of literature was conducted from September 2011 
through August 2012 to retrieve the available information and identify gaps 
pertinent to the adaptive capacity of command decision making during the initial 
operational period of disaster response. This search revealed two primary areas 
of relevant research including leadership/decision making and situational 
awareness. The use of geographic imagery and the development of collaboration 
were determined to be peripheral areas of research. 
A. COMMAND DECISION MAKING 
Command decisions in the high-risk, time sensitive environment of 
emergency response are required by the need for immediate action.  First 
responders often confront the challenge of responding to novel incidents with a 
lack of both exposure and experience.9  Exposure consists of having a presence 
at events of similar magnitude, while experience is the knowledge and skill 
acquired in a profession through observation and mentoring. Lacking a solid 
foundation of both exposure and experience, Incident Commanders can easily 
fall back on personal belief, morals, values and upbringing as a source of 
reactive decision making when managing the response to disasters.10  As 
effective decision making is a learned domain, decisions need to emanate from a 
wealth of both experience and judgment. 
In 1987, Gary Klein, a well-known expert on fireground command decision 
making, developed a descriptive model of the naturalistic decision-making 
process. This research identified that many command decisions are reflective of 
                                            
9 Neil R. Hintze, "First Responder Problem Solving and Decision-making in Today's 
Asymmetrical Environment" (Master of Arts in Security Studies (Homeland Security and 
Defense), Naval Postgraduate School), . 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Mar/08Mar_Hintze.pdf. P V. 
10 Robert T. Mahoney, "Deciding Who Lives: Considered Risk Casualty Decisions in 
Homeland Security" (Master of Arts in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense), Naval 
Postgraduate School), 166. 
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the Incident Commander’s previous experience.11 As an example, a capable and 
experienced commander referencing his/her previous field experience may order 
the evacuation of an entire city block based on a similar experience where a 
collapse resulted in injuries to bystanders when only the buildings adjacent to the 
fire were evacuated. In this example, the commander employed the lens of 
his/her experience to make a safer decision. 
Klien’s work is complimented by Gladwell’s concept of thin slicing where 
the unconscious mind finds patterns in situations based on a comparison of very 
narrow slices of experience.12  Thin slicing utilizes rapid cognition to zero in on 
what really matters and utilizes intuitive repulsion to know instinctively that 
something is not right.13  Gasaway argues that intuition is a vital component of 
decision making, especially when the decision maker is under stress, such as 
during combat operations. Intuition produces decisions much quicker, as it relies 
on the Incident Commander’s experience without having to analyze every aspect 
of the problem. Emotional memory is derived from one’s experiences and may 
guide the decider through what ICs often attribute to a “gut feeling”. In these 
instances, commanders instinctively know what to do, although they may not 
quite know why.14   
Intuition is not fool proof, as it is closely related to pattern recognition and 
can lead to the wrong decision. Sometimes this recognition leads to the wrong 
conclusion and often occurs when the event is unfamiliar and beyond the 
experience of the commander.15  Gasaway further notes that significant parallels 
                                            
11 Calderwood, Crandall and.Klein, Expert and Novice Fire Ground Command Decisions, iii. 
12 Gladwell, Blink, 47. 
13 Ibid., 119. 
14 Richard B. Gasaway. "Making Intuitive Decisions Under Stress: Understanding Fireground 
Incident Command Decision-Making." International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and 
Management 1, no. 1 (2007): 11. 
15 Gasaway. Making Intuitive Decisions, 15. 
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exist between decision-making methodology on the battlefield and during the 
response to unpredictable emergency incidents.16 
This foundational research outlines the differences that exist between 
experienced commanders, known as experts, and relatively inexperienced 
commanders known as novices. In an emergency setting, veteran responders 
use the benefit of experience to face unfamiliar situations and focus on 
addressing complex situational aspects. In contrast, the novice has limited 
experience and typically focuses on utility, concurrent evaluation, implementation 
and timing when facing the unfamiliar. Experts also have the capability to 
construct innovative options using mental imagery in a research study they were 
twice as likely to consider future contingencies in the context of their decision 
making.17 This research provides a strong case for the value of experience and 
suggests that support systems, such as geospatial information tools, incident 
management teams (IMTs), and reconnaissance efforts can provide a more 
accurate situational assessment.18  
Experience changes the nature of a person’s first impressions, helps the 
expert sift through the situation, and throws out the irrelevant while zeroing in on 
what really matters.19  Experts utilize learned behavior and training to interpret 
and decode a situation. Gladwell identifies that experience is the foundation for 
the snap judgments that are critical to the spontaneity required as first 
responders address emergencies.20  
Considering the time pressure inherent to effectively managing an 
emergency, generating, and then considering several potentially viable options is 
precluded. In fact, the time taken to consider multiple alternatives may allow the 
                                            
16 Gasaway. Making Intuitive Decisions, 9. 
17 Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, Expert and Novice Fire Ground Command Decisions P 
iii. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Gladwell, Blink, 142. 
20 Ibid.  
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emergency to expand producing unacceptable losses prior to the selection of an 
appropriate course of action. Gasaway notes that conditions of an unstable, fast 
moving incident rarely improve when the Incident Commander procrastinates on 
time-sensitive decisions.21 Klein indicates that less than 20 percent of decisions 
of the fireground involve the concurrent evaluation of multiple potential courses of 
action.22 Deliberation that does occur focuses on the nature of the problem itself 
and places a strong emphasis on the need for a high level of situational analysis 
as a prerequisite to operational success. 
As artists, experts use the foundation of experience to evaluate patterns, 
observe cues and create the adaptive capacity23 to consider complex and 
uncertain decision points. To illustrate this point, a novice often breaks down a 
single decision point for an expert into several time-consuming decision points. 
As an example, a fire officer may be well versed and considered to be an expert 
when dealing with a residential structure fire but be relatively inexperienced and 
considered to be a novice when commanding the response to a release of 
sulfuric acid.  
The concept of naturalistic decision making was further expanded in 1993, 
as Klein developed the Recognition Primed Decision-making Model (RPD). This 
model identifies that reflection on prior experience as a means to identify patterns 
in emergency response avoids some of the limitations of analytical strategies and 
provides the ability to make rapid decisions in complex field situations. Traditional 
decision-making models utilized in nonemergency situations have the advantage 
of time to develop and consider a host of viable alternatives. Considering the 
time pressure inherent to emergency response, RPD indicates that fireground 
                                            
21 Gasaway, Making Intuitive Decisions, 9. 
22 Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, Expert and Novice Fire Ground Command Decisions, v. 
23 Adaptive capacity is the capacity of a system to adapt, if the environment where the 
system exists is changing. 
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decisions do not fit into a typical decision tree and identifies that choice points 
rely on the leader’s ability to recognize and appropriately classify a situation.24 
RPD appears to be a productive strategy that uses the lens of experience 
to generate, evaluate, and then rapidly implement the course of action most likely 
to be successful. Emergency response does not provide the luxury of time to find 
the optimal course of action. Instead, the concept of satisficing, which facilitates 
the selection of a good workable option as opposed to the optimal option, is 
employed. Expert commanders utilize mental simulation to determine if the 
option selected through satisficing will work, as it is applied to the situation at 
hand. This strategy requires the prerequisite of comparative experience to 
provide a perspective that facilitates the rapid commitment and action needed 
during emergencies. Although RPD provides a model for action, novices often 
revert to more time consuming, analytical actions as they lack the relevant 
experience required to utilize RPD.25 
RPD has become a time-tested foundational model that explains the 
principles of decision making in emergency response settings.26  RPD 
differentiates the capabilities of novices and experts and notes that training in 
situation recognition could improve performance. RPD stands as a strong aspect 
of understanding decision making in emergencies, but it is not a comprehensive 
answer to the research questions posed, as it fails to consider the propensity for 
unstable incidents to expand into the chaotic context.  
The Cynefin Framework identifies that decision making in emergency 
response situations primarily exists in the unordered complex domain where 
unpredictability and flux are common.27 This framework is the first to consider 
and classify the magnitude of emergency events and suggests that events can 
                                            
24 Klein, A Recognition, 139. 
25 Ibid., 145. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Snowden and Boone, A Leader's Framework for Decision-making: A Leader's Framework 
for Decision-making, 68–76. 
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transition from the complex context into the chaotic complex. This model 
provides leaders with the ability to see things from new viewpoints, assimilate 
concepts, and, based on the active operational context, pursue different decision-
making strategies.28  The Cynefin Framework is a system typology developed by 
David Snowden in 1999. This framework classifies situations into five domains 
including; simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, and disorder (see Figure 1). 
The Cynefin Framework indicates that emergency incidents typically exist in the 
complex context where a leader would need to probe the situation, sense the 
problem, and the respond. In this situation, patterns that lead to resolution 
emerge as a guide to decision making. This domain of the model would 
challenge a novice, but according to RPD, be manageable for an expert decision 
maker. 
In rare instances, such as during the initial response to the surge events 
associated with acts of terrorism or natural disasters, situations become chaotic. 
During these abnormal situations that transition into the chaotic context, no 
patterns exist, and the leader needs to first act to establish order and then 
convert the situation into the complex context where patterns emerge.29  The 
transformation from the complex to the chaotic context indicates that a different 
approach is needed in these situations, but Snowden’s research does not reflect 
on how relative experience affects the transformational capability of the 
individual. 
 
                                            
28 Snowden and Boone, A Leader's Framework for Decision-making: A Leader's Framework 
for Decision-making, 1. 
29 Ibid,. 3. 
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Figure 1.   Cynefin Framework Diagram (From Snowden 1999) 
In his article on the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447, Wise presents an 
example of both the need for experience to address chaotic events and indicates 
how an expert can regress to a novice when confronted with a novel situation. As 
flight 447 flew over the Atlantic Ocean, an experienced co-pilot, who would be an 
expert under normal conditions, misperceived a complex and unfamiliar situation. 
At one point, the co-pilot exclaims “I don’t understand what is happening.” This 
misperception, which was based on a lack of both training and relative 
experience, caused the situation to become chaotic.30 
                                            
30 Jeff Wise, "What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447." Popular Mechanics 
(December 6, 2011). 7.  
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The intense psychological pressure of this novel event shut down the part 
of the brain that is responsible for creative and innovative thought.31  This 
caused the co-pilot to react and return to the familiar. Regressing to familiar 
actions that were inappropriate in this situation ultimately contributed to the 
crash. 
Building upon aspects of the material referenced above, Diaz examined 
how decisions are made in rare, “novel” environments, such as in a terrorist 
attack where first responders have little or no familiarity with the situation, as they 
lack the frame of reference provided by experience.32  During these events, 
commanders employ sense making to decode the unbelievable or unfamiliar. 
Lacking both experience and key pieces of situational information, decision 
makers are often reluctant to act. This paralysis produces response delays that 
detract from operational effectiveness. In these situations, even the most 
experienced Incident Commanders can easily be overwhelmed and experience 
stress. A common aspect of stress is information overload. As the human brain 
limits information flow based on overload, less than optimal decisions can be 
produced by the brain’s protective action that may limit the cognitive knowledge 
of essential situational information.33 
Diaz presents ten common factors that affect the quality of decision 
making during the response to novel situations. These factors can serve to 
enhance or deteriorate the quality of decision making in the chaotic environment. 
These include; control of the situation (or lack thereof), control of arousal, 
openness to the environment, having an active role in the decision-making 
process, the ability to imagine the outcome through mental simulation, collective 
problem solving ability, perspective, information, and comfort working in an 
                                            
31 Jeff Wise, "What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447." Popular Mechanics 
(December 6, 2011). 7.  
32 Sara K. Diaz, "Where Do I Start? Decision-making in Complex Novel Environments" 
(Master of Arts in Security Studies (Homeland Defense and Security), Naval Postgraduate 
School). 3. 
33 Ibid., 10. 
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unknown situation.34  Diaz recommends following principles to serve as a guide 
for leaders, as they approach these critical situations: 
1. Work in a manner not to exceed memory capacity 
 
2. Monitor and regulate emotion 
 
3. Consider the memory capacity of subordinates.  
Synthesizing the findings of Klein and Snowden, when an emergency 
exists in the chaotic context of the Cynefin Framework, insufficient patterns and 
cues exist to apply RPD. In chaotic situations, an effective leader needs to 
generate widespread cohesive action that expands their domain of influence and 
leverage.35 The concept of Meta-leadership capability considers the ability of the 
leader, the situation, designated authority and the ability to engender 
collaboration through influencing both superiors and other organizations.36 
Meta-leaders are those individuals whose scope of thinking, influence and 
accomplishment extends far beyond their formal or expected bounds of authority. 
These individuals have the unique capacity to generate widespread cohesive 
action that expands their domain of influence and leverage.37  Crises allow 
extraordinary meta-leaders to emerge. Marked by strength of character and keen 
analytic skill, these unique leaders have the ability to lead, follow and 
productively engage others. These qualities forge an impact and level of 
collaboration not otherwise attained.38 
 
 
                                            
34 Diaz, Where Do I Start 11. 
35 Leonard J. Marcus et al., The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership (Cambridge, MA: 
National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, Harvard School of Public Health, 2007). 2. 
36 Ibid., 2, 28. 
37 Ibid., 2.  
38 Marcus et al., The Five Dimensions. 24. 
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Three aspects of decision making during emergency response are 
discussed within this portion of the literature review. These research concepts 
are cumulative in that they complement and build upon each other. These 
models are: 
1. Recognition primed decision making (RPD), as developed by Klein 
2. Thin slicing and intuitive repulsion by Gladwell 
3. The Cynefin Framework for decision making by Snowden 
4. The role of meta-leadership that influence decision making during 
novel situations by Marcus. 
Although each aspect provides insight, all four models rely on the 
experience of experts for the effective management of the initial phase of 
emergency response. The need to develop novices into experts through both 
exposure and experiential training and mentoring is not addressed, nor is the 
concept that a person may be an expert in one situation and transform into a 
novice when facing the unfamiliar chaotic situation. As it is difficult to prepare for 
tragic situations that have not yet been envisioned, consideration should be given 
to developing tools that can enhance decision making in unfamiliar environments 
for both novel and expert decision makers, who will face both complex and 
chaotic emergency situations. 
B. AGILITY AND DISCIPLINE 
In contrast with the models presented, Harrald indicates that expertise is 
not a singular solution; instead, a balance of both agility and discipline are 
required to successfully mitigate emergency incidents. Discipline includes 
structure, doctrine, and process. Agility includes the ability to innovate through 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which is typically a closed 
and rigid system.39 
                                            
39 John R., Harrald, Jospeh Barbera, Irmak Renda-Tanali, Damon Coppola, and Gregory L. 
Shaw. Observing and Documenting the Inter-Organizational Response to the September 11th 
Attack on the Pentagon. Washington, DC: The George Washington University, Institute for Crisis, 
Disaster and Risk Management, 2002. 261. 
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Extreme events produce unforeseen problems and conditions requiring 
adaption, improvisation, and creativity to deliver services under extreme 
conditions. In these rare cases, discipline that includes structure, doctrine, and 
process must be balanced by creativity, improvisation and adaptability. In these 
novel situations, there is a tradeoff between the command and control necessary 
for mobilization, and the need to ensure broad coordination and communication. 
When facing extreme events, response must begin without a complete 
situation or needs assessment. During this initial period, it should be expected 
that a detailed, credible common operating picture may not be available for 
twenty-four to forty-eight hours.40  Often, the initial response is conducted by 
resources in the area reacting to the immediate needs of the situation, while 
external resources are mobilized to address the situation comprehensively.41 
C. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Obtaining timely and accurate information about a situation is essential to 
making the best possible decisions, as first responders engage in crisis events. 
Each of the decision-making sources cited outline the necessity of developing 
situation-based information as a precursor to effective decision making. 
Therefore, situational awareness appears to be a direct link to operational 
success. 
Decision making in high-stress emergency response environments is 
subject to time pressure, significant uncertainty, and life safety concerns, and 
these factors require that an effective IC develop a high level of situational 
awareness.42  Emergency situations are fast paced, confusing and evolving, 
                                            
40 John R., Harrald, Jospeh Barbera, Irmak Renda-Tanali, Damon Coppola, and Gregory L. 
Shaw. Observing and Documenting the Inter-Organizational Response to the September 11th 
Attack on the Pentagon. Washington, DC: The George Washington University, Institute for Crisis, 
Disaster and Risk Management, 2002. 261. 
41 Ibid., 257. 
42 U.S. Department of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
Situation Awareness and Decision-making in a Warning Environment (Washington, DC: National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 7. 
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which creates the demand for certainty and leads to a demand for information, 
but in the early chaos of an events, this information may often be incorrect and 
misleading. Seldom, if ever, will information obtained during the initial response 
to surge incidents be accurate43. Gasaway notes that the Incident Commander 
needs to piece together a semblance of what is actually happening as the 
incident evolves.44 
Situational awareness is the art of understanding your surroundings while 
developing three levels of environmental awareness. These levels are 
perception, comprehension, and projection.45  Perception is the ability to evaluate 
the crisis. Comprehension builds upon perception and forms when the leader 
understands the possibilities and ramifications associated with an event. 
Projection is the ability to predict the path of the event and then order a response 
that complements both present and future incident conditions.46  Hintze indicates 
that proper evaluation of a situation is key to forming a perception. Perception 
stands as a cornerstone of understanding, but perception is often limited by poor 
information flow and the human tendency to filter information and find information 
to support our pre-existing conclusions.47 
Gasaway notes that a challenge to good situational analysis is the 
complexity of systems during an emergency response. As an incident develops, 
the complexity of systems increases, which in turn increases the mental workload 
of the Incident Commander. In these cases, the mental workload required to 
achieve a given level of situational analysis is immense, and when human 
capability is exceeded, situational analysis will suffer.48 
                                            
43 Gasaway, Making Intuitive Decisions, 9. 
44 Ibid., 10. 
45 Hintze, First Responder Problem Solving, 18. 
46 Ibid., 18. 
47 U.S. Department of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
Situation Awareness and Decision-making in a Warning Environment. 40. 
48 Gasaway, Making Intuitive Decisions, 13. 
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Once a leader understands the situation, he/she can then begin to identify 
the patterns and cues identified within Klein’s research on RPD to mitigate the 
situation. Pfiefer claims that gathering situational awareness empowers the 
Incident Commander to make sense of a situation and anticipate shifting 
conditions.49  This concept is recognized in the research of both Klein and Diaz. 
In essence, situational awareness is developing a big picture or macro view of an 
event. McNealy provides a battlefield perspective, by observing that situational 
awareness is “the continuous extraction of information, integration of this 
information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental picture in 
directing future perception and anticipating future events.” 50  
Often the level of information during a crisis event is overwhelming. Diaz 
states that this quantity of information, common to emergencies, needs to be 
filtered to reduce overload of memory capacity.51  Salience of data needs to be 
considered as information is evaluated. One concern is the human tendency of 
misplaced salience, which occurs when an absence of data is assumed to 
indicate that a phenomenon does not exist.52  Flexibility in emergency response 
decision making depends on identifying cues and understanding the context of 
an event. The absence of patterns and cues reflects back to the value of 
experience identified within the Naturalistic Decision-making Model. Leveraging 
experience, a commander can utilize the absence of familiar patterns and cues 
called “broke pattern matching” to identify the absence of the familiar and sense 
danger.53 
                                            
49 Joseph W. Pfeifer, "Command Resiliency: An Adaptive Response Strategy for Complex 
Incidents" (Master of Arts in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense), Naval 
Postgraduate School). 15. 
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Another common finding is that situational awareness should not be 
constrained by organizational boundaries. Stovepipe situational awareness 
develops when information is held in organizational silos and not shared between 
agencies. This lack of information sharing reflects organizational culture, bias, 
previous history, inter-organizational conflict or interoperability limitations. In his 
thesis, Pfiefer provides an example of how information held by the NYPD on 9/11 
contributed to catastrophic consequences.54  In this case, information was 
retained within the stovepipe of a single organization based on history and 
conflict. 
The concept of novices and experts exists within the realm of situational 
analysis. Hintze claims that a novice reacts; often taking either too much time to 
determine the best course of action or selecting inappropriate actions. In the 
alternative, experts think and reflect on past experience.55  As a result, experts 
are better able to process information. Experience allows experts to develop 
comparative models while a novice allows the complexity of the problem to be a 
distraction. Experts have a high capability of framing the problem and looking for 
pattern matches.56 
Charles Burkell, Director of the National Fire Academy, Executive Fire 
Officer Program, said “in the absence of experience, fire service organizations 
need to include time pressure, shifting conditions, and information gaps in 
training exercises as a way to build proficiency in lieu of having been there and 
done that.”57  Building on the statement from Burkell, Hintze claims that the 
concept of experts and novices identifies the need for simulation-based training 
                                            
54 Pfeifer, Command Resiliency, 16. Pfeifer claims that on 9/11 signs of imminent collapse of 
the North Tower of the World Trade Center were observed by NYPD helicopters. This information 
was transmitted to NYPD Emergency Service Units (ESU) personnel resulting in an urgent 
evacuation of the building. These observations were not shared with fire department commanders 
and an orderly evacuation of fire department personnel resulted in the loss of personnel. 
55 Hintze, First Responder Problem Solving, 21. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid., 28. 
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and mentoring as tool that can help a novice build proficiency.58  As the incident 
expands, the ability for a single Incident Commander to collect and process all of 
the information essential to developing a high level of situation awareness can 
easily produce the sensory overload referenced by Diaz. 
D. COLLABORATION 
Decision making in complex environments requires both a high level of 
situational knowledge, information sharing, and collaboration. Collaborative 
capacity is the collective ability of a networked team to collect, synthesize and 
prioritize information essential to managing events within the unordered context 
of the Cynefin Model. During emergency response situations, hastily formed 
networks often develop in an effort to address problems beyond the scope of a 
single organization.59  The ability to form and leverage collaborative networks 
reflect both organizational culture and social identity. Networks are built on trust, 
respect, dependability, relationships, and previously formed inter-organizational 
association.60 
The need for collaboration increases as the complexity of decision making 
and task interdependence increase. The foundation of collaboration is openness, 
shared purpose, commitment to a common goal, and establishing bi-directional 
pathways of communication.61 
Partnerships, including multi-agency and public-private coalitions are a 
growing reality and an adaptive way to face the growing complexity of emerging 
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threats.62  Public managers frequently find themselves operating in multi-
organizational environments as a means to solve problems that cannot be solved 
by a single organization.63  In these collaborative environments, conflict should 
be expected. During the response to asymmetric incidents, the conflict inherent 
to collaboration needs to be managed and exploited as a means to produce 
innovative solutions.64 
The impact of chaotic incidents often spreads over traditional boundaries; 
when this occurs, a shared responsibility between involved agencies develops. 
The presence of multiple actors produces an environment of shared risk that 
serves as a springboard toward innovation. Chaotic events often lead to a 
greater density of communication and crisis-based cohesion. This cohesion 
serves to suspend conflict in the interest of meeting shared urgent needs. These 
linkages can promote trust that may lead to new collaborative initiatives. As 
relationships develop, social capital accumulates in increased respect, trust 
information exchange, and mutual understanding contribute to collaborative 
capacity and creates a unique window of opportunity.65 Reciprocal trust is 
developed through a sense of mutual respect, which is built by experience over 
time. Effective collaborators focus on the shared vision of the team and the 
concept of “we” as opposed to the self-serving interest of “I.”66 
Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen claim that the personal aspects of 
collaboration should not be underestimated. Often collaboration is attained 
through a personal touch, handshake and a smile.67  Focusing on relationships, 
the literature agrees that interdependence creates a shared purpose and the 
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determination of a joint mission. Working as a team creates an environment that 
supports intelligent improvisation, which may lead to new strategic options and 
solutions.  
As an example of the power of relationships and trust, a significant portion 
of the response to the Pentagon disaster on September 11, 2001 was attributed 
to the willingness of the Arlington Fire Department to make the effort to 
communicate with other agencies prior to the incident and support joint 
preplanning activities.68  During the response to this disaster, the command 
structure continued to build emergent relationships and foster a collaborative and 
flexible organizational structure. This adaptability set the stage for the 
development of an improvised and creative response that addressed unfamiliar 
problems. This open and inclusive response leveraged nontraditional external 
resources and personnel in the interest of producing the best possible level of 
coordination.69 
Group communication and information sharing remains a problem 
identified within the literature. Often the environment of emergency response 
requires the connection of several decentralized actors.70  Technology provides 
a potential mechanism to connect decentralized actors and allow collaboration 
necessary to take advantage of collective intelligence and complementary skill.71 
E. GEOSPATIAL TECHNOLOGY 
Crisis events are highly dynamic and are unpredictable in terms of time 
and resource needs.72  Geo-collaborative technology integrates geographic 
information systems with resource management databases to produce interactive 
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technology that can support decision making. This technology serves as a tool to 
promote shared situational analysis, build a common vision, filter information, 
and facilitate effective decision making in the emergency response environment.  
The development of interactive technologies associated with Web 2.0, 
creates the opportunity for remote collaboration and real time three-dimensional 
emergency response applications in micro-spatial environments.73  Mobile 
computing is an aid for command and communication that can provide decision 
support by promoting the consistency of interaction.74  As too much information 
is just as harmful as too little information, geospatial technologies can vastly 
increase both information flow and situational analysis.75 Mobile computing can 
serve as tremendous aid for both command and communication; this technology 
is designed to promote the consistency of interaction.76 
Caution needs to be exercised; as technology can unleash vast quantities 
of information. There is little doubt that too much information can be just as 
harmful as too little information.77  Often issues involving technology are not 
technical but involve business processes and adaptive aspects of how humans 
interact with these capabilities. Currently many geographic information systems 
(GIS) can add definition and perception to a problem. Often this technology is 
hard to use and fails to address immediacy and the other special needs of crisis 
managers who often work in teams that share information, knowledge and 
judgment while making decisions under stress.78  Researchers note that the use 
of technology in collaborative crisis environments has not been fully explored. 
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Cai, an expert on geospatial technology, summarizes that challenges with 
GIS include immediacy, availability, and sharing of information. GIS offers great 
potential, as much of the data underpinning critical decisions is geospatial in 
nature.79  Managers need robust tools to integrate information about fast 
developing situations that occur in a geospatial context. 
Visual display of information encourages broad participation, as maps 
encode spatial relationships and enable shared understanding. Maps can be 
objects of collaboration and support both dialogue and common work.80 
GIS is not typically designed to represent dynamic phenomena and little 
research has been completed in this area, despite the consequences of making 
critical decisions with less than complete information.81  GIS offers a synthesized 
model for improved decision making to minimize disasters. Geographic 
information systems organize data into layers that can be integrated, or removed, 
based on the specific needs of the user(s). These layers provide an efficient tool 
to filter information and dissect problems. However, the availability of GIS based 
education and access to Geocollaborative technology remain barriers to the wide 
spread adoption of this technology. Future research needs to focus on human 
adoption, education, and the integration of existing data. This is a particularly 
important research need, as a lack of integration can cause emergency 
managers to quickly revert to the use of paper maps.  
Geocollaborative crisis management, the ability to used geographic job 
aids to assist in the management of emergencies is in its infancy, and it faces the 
challenges of both role definition and the lack of existing models. Currently GIS 
does not support a wide variety of crisis management applications that allow 
input from several remote locations. The increasing need for mobile solutions is 
driven by the need to develop a common operating picture through shared 
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81 John Radke et al., Challenges for GIS in Emergency Preparedness and Response 
(Redlands, CA: Environmental Systems Research Institute, 2000). 
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intelligence. Computer supported cooperative work suggests that GIS is poised 
to provide the benefit of a collaboratively developed information platform. This 
platform has the potential to enhance operational effectiveness, as it reduces the 
need to share data on an individual basis.82  Web 2.0 applications are positioned 
to meet many of the collaborative needs defined above. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A consistent theme and a surprising level of concurrence exists 
throughout the body of research pertaining to the importance of situational 
analysis. Reviewing the literature, the five common themes listed below 
emerged: 
1. Situational awareness is directly related to the quality of 
communication flow. 
2. The ability to filter information to form a coherent mental picture is 
essential. 
3. Situational awareness and collaborative information sharing are 
fundamental to developing a shared understanding of the mission 
or problem. 
4. Using imagery or graphical display to summarize information is an 
opportunity to improve situational awareness. 
5. Experienced fire officers who are considered to be experts in their 
field may become novices when faced with the chaotic, complex 
and unfamiliar surge incident. 
Literature in the area of command decision making links to information 
flow, situational awareness, collaboration, and the utilization of technology. The 
literature pertaining to the scope of this research has broad agreement on the 
importance of situational awareness, collaboration, and the use of technology to 
aid in decision making. Research within the area of command decision making 
has produced complimentary models that build upon previous contributions.  
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Although research on command decision making has produced valuable results 
that have shaped advancements in this specialized discipline, the depth of 
research could be expanded.  
A review of the literature reveals that four research gaps exist, and the 
opportunity to focus on transitional aspects of command remains underexplored. 
The areas of opportunity are listed below: 
1. Evaluation of interdisciplinary approaches to management of 
resources during chaotic events in an effort to develop 
multidiscipline best practices. 
2. Identification of the social aspects that impact command decision 
making. 
3. Research on the transition of incidents from complex to chaotic 
contexts. 
4. Research concerning the potential for individuals to transition from 
being experts when facing complex, but previously experienced 
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III. CONSIDERING THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE TO INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to assist Incident Commanders and 
enhance decision making. This thesis is centered on the need to consider 
adaptive decision-making methodologies beyond the structure of NIMS 
particularly in situations of high complexity and uncertainty. As such, including a 
comparative analysis with an alternative IMS offers the potential to identify best 
practices and sow the seeds of innovation.  
This chapter presents a comparative analysis between NIMS, which is the 
command system utilized in the United States, and regulation DV 100, also 
known as Dienstvorschrift 100 entitled Leadership and Command in Emergency 
Operations that was authorized by the German Board of Firefighting Affairs.83  
Based on a combination of history, culture, and experience, Germany and the 
United States use different methods to approach incident management. Although 
both Germany and the United States utilize incident command to structure 
operations, significant differences in the application of this principle exist. 
Comparatively, Germany consists of 137,847 square miles while the 
United States consists of 3,717,813 square miles. Germany has 81,799,600 
residents while the United States hosts a population of 311,591,917. When 
considering the impact on a comparative analysis of fire services, land area and 
population clearly matter. Based on this analysis, Germany has approximately 
1/30th of the relative land area and 25 percent of the relative population to 
protect.  
The Federalist principles that form the backbone of the United States 
governance system ensure that the responsibility to provide public safety 
                                            
83 Fuhrung und Leitung im Einsatz - Fuhrungssytem. "Leadership and Command in 
Emergency Operations." DV 100. 12 20, 2007. 43. 
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predominantly rests with each local political subdivision.84  As a result, American 
Fire Service agencies operate by political subdivisions and have little 
involvement with their respective parent states. Presently, more than 30,625 fire 
departments85 exist within the United States, and this compares to 102 fire 
departments that exist within Germany.86   
The German Fire Service was born in a wartime culture and formed 
through the necessity to confront the threat of fire on a national level. This 
suggests that a more militaristic and centralized approach to providing fire 
services exists within Germany. This conclusion is supported by the responsibility 
to provide public safety residing with each German State. 
Staffing for fire protection for both countries follows a similar model 
utilizing a mix of career and volunteer personnel. Volunteer firefighters make up 
80 percent87 of personnel in Germany and 72 percent of the fire service in the 
United States.88 Germany has ingrained a culture of volunteerism into its 
citizens, and certain volunteer activities can offer an alternative to military 
service.89  This produces a strong pool of volunteers and reflects a high level of 
nationalism. Although volunteer firefighters are part of the fabric of America, 
volunteerism has decreased and many agencies struggle to find sufficient 
personnel.  
The role of the fire service varies between the United States and 
Germany. In the United States, the role of the fire service has expanded to meet 
the needs of each individual community. As an example, 59 percent of fire 
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service agencies in the United States provide Emergency Medical Services.90 In 
Germany, although there is inter-agency cooperation, the provision of medical 
care is considered a separate discipline. Contrary to the experience of the United 
States, Germany has a strong relationship of public and private (NGOs) as the 
majority of disaster relief is accomplished by these organizations.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the incident 
management methods utilized by each country in the hope that best practices 
can be identified and potentially implemented.91  It also offers a view of the 
internal workings of two diverse fire service cultures. In addition to the knowledge 
that can be extracted through this analysis, this analysis was utilized to inform 
the development of questions for the Round Three Delphi survey which is 
presented in Chapter VI. 
B. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
The control of emergency situations uses an incident command system to 
organize response. Crisis policies have developed on the unique experience of 
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91 Governance, law and policy differ between the United States and Germany. The United 
States is a federal constitutional republic, in which the President of the United States (the head of 
state and head of government), Congress, and judiciary share powers reserved to the national 
government, and the federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments.The 
federal entity created by the U.S. Constitution is the dominant feature of the American 
governmental system. However, most people are also subject to a state government, and all are 
subject to various units of local government. The latter include counties, municipalities, and 
special districts.This multiplicity of jurisdictions reflects the country's history. The federal 
government was created by the states, which as colonies were established separately and 
governed themselves independently of the others. Units of local government were created by the 
colonies to efficiently carry out various state functions. As the country expanded, it admitted new 
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regional states). The political system is laid out in the 1949 constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law), which remained in effect with minor amendments after 1990's German reunification. The 
constitution emphasizes the protection of individual liberty in an extensive catalogue of human 
rights and divides powers both between the federal and state levels and between the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches. 
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each country and the emergence of different threats that can be identified to 
explain policy divergence.92 As an example, Germany’s crisis policy reflects the 
experience of enduring the wrath of two world wars that occurred on German soil 
within the last century. Although the United States has been immune from the 
consequences of large-scale war, we have endured the emergence of the 
challenges associated with the impact of the attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2001. 
Disasters consist of situations that are large scale, costly, unexpected, 
and disruptive. Often these crises can be of such magnitude that even the most 
robust organizations are challenged or overwhelmed. During these situations, the 
challenge is focused on system integration at the user interface level.93 
In the United States, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
was adopted as the single multidisciplinary system to provide a coordinated and 
centralized system of direction during times of crisis.94  Although many agencies 
were reluctant to adopt this concept, and shortcomings exist in adaptability, the 
use of this system has become a standard protocol for U.S. fire services.95  In 
practice, NIMS is a command and control system that operates effectively when 
homogenous organizations with similar goals are integrated into a single 
organization. This homogenous orientation has produced a closed system where 
the local Incident Commander typically maintains operational control and 
facilitates decision making.96   
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In Germany, regulation DV 100 also known as Dienstvorschrift 100 
entitled Leadership and Command in Emergency Operations was authorized by 
the Board of Firefighting Affairs.97  This regulation, developed in accordance with 
the German Federal Constitution, places the responsibility for emergency 
response on the 16 German States and defines the command and control 
system that is utilized within Germany. DV100 was implemented in 1999 and was 
then adopted by other national organizations, such as the Federal Agency for 
Technical Relief (German Red Cross). It has evolved into the single system 
utilized in Germany for the purposes of incident control. 
The goal of both the German and United States command and control 
system is to act swiftly and appropriately to generate uniformity and consistency 
and implement complex and technical measures during emergency situations. A 
comparison of the 26 page DV 100 and the 170 page United States National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) reveals several remarkable similarities and 
some stark differences.  
In Germany, Regulation DV 100 established the staff system and 
identified six unique functions. NIMS identified four staff functions, which are 
significantly different from those presented within DV100. Despite these 
differences, both use an organized approach first developed by Napoleon, based 
on specified staff functions within command and control systems.98    
A comparative analysis of these systems indicates that there are several 
common issues and challenges that are faced collectively by both DV100 and 
NIMS. These common challenges include the ability to maintain the motivation, 
competence and confidence of personnel given the relatively infrequent 
occurrence of large-scale disasters.99  Often this produces a lack of capability, as 
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personnel are unfamiliar and uncomfortable with these critical roles. The need for 
collaboration and technical information sharing systems or job aids is a challenge 
that has been reported by users of both NIMS and DV100. This suggests a need 
for technology and job aides that can improve sustainability, and interaction.100 
Another commonality is that both systems evolved from fire service roots 
to an all hazards platform. NIMS and DV 100 are staff function based and rely on 
motivated staff as a key to success. Neither system seeks to micromanage 
operations and both allow tactical crews with the operational flexibility necessary 
to achieve mission goals. Other similarities include the recognition of the value of 
social relationships to assist in collaboration and the need to involve senior 
elected officials in disaster response.101 
In contrast to the similarities noted above, DV 100 offers a strikingly 
humanistic approach that concentrates on the value of personnel, relationships, 
confidence, and the impact of “command attitude.”102  Although NIMS provides 
structure as detailed below, the German Command Chart extends beyond 
structure to address both process and means. DV 100 looks beyond the structure 
of command and control and focuses on both strategy or processes (defined as 
process (procedures) in Figure 2) and tactics (presented as means (equipment)). 
In contrast, the NIMS model solely emphasizes structure and the subsidiary 
functions of Operations, Planning and Finance. These differences are illustrated 
in Figures 2 and 3.103 
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Figure 2.   German Command Chart (From DV 100)  
 
Figure 3.   NIMS Based Command Chart (NIMS) 
The humanistic approach of DV 100 also emphasizes the influence of 
leadership and the need to employ a situational style that promotes collaboration, 
confidence and motivation.104   DV 100 is also different from NIMS in that it 
indicates that the process of incident control is a circular system that emphasizes 
the need for information and situational analysis as a precursor to effective 
decision making.105  This circular mission process is detailed within Figure 4. 
Although an IC using NIMS will employ situational analysis to make sense of a 
situation, NIMS subordinates the value of information in favor of the command 
and control structure. The inherent  focus of DV 100 on the importance of 
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situational analysis is one of the larger differences observed by people who are 
familiar with the use of both of these command systems.106 
 
Figure 4.   German Circular Mission Process (From DV 100) 
American IC often relies of the use of experience and the early  
recognition of patterns and cues as a guide to action. DV 100 answers that the 
use of experience is a mistake, as it promotes reliance on the past and leaves 
the Incident Commander with few options when unfamilar situations emerge.107 
In America, command most often falls to the local agency or a unified 
group of involved agencies. This fails to recognize the need for the automatic 
deployment of incident support. Germany utilizes a three-person command team 
called a “zug” to provide the first line of command support.108  This concept 
provides support to the local IC and links a command team to the resources of a 
command centre. The organization of a “zug” is presented in Figure 5. DV 100 
recognizes the need for both on-site and off-site support. Reflecting a more 
nationalistic focus, command teams are prestructured into teams of three to nine 
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personnel that automatically respond as incidents escalate.109  American ICS 
lacks both the recognition of the need for this level of command support and 
automation of this process. 
 
 
Figure 5.   German Command Team Structure to control a company “Zug” (From 
DV 100) 
Although both systems rely on staff functions as the basis of command 
and control, these staff functions differ dramatically between the United States 
and Germany. In the United States, staff functions include Operations, Planning, 
Logistics and Finance. These positions are augmented by Command Liaisons, 
Safety Officers, and Public Information Officers. The German approach includes 
six staff functions that include; personnel and administration, information 
gathering and assessment, operations, logistics, media and press, and 
communications and transmission. DV 100 also demonstrates the inclusion of 
experts and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as representatives of 
agencies involved in the incident. The staff functions outlined in DV 100 are 
detailed in Figure 6. When compared to NIMS, DV 100 provides three unique 
                                            
109 Fuhrung und Leitung im Einsatz - Fuhrungssytem. Fuhrung und Leitung im Einsatz - 
Fuhrungssytem. Leadership and Command. 
 38 
staff functions that are not contained within NIMS. As an example of these 
divergent staff functions, the NIMS based finance section is not included in the 
German system, and the staff function of personnel and administration is not 
included within the scope of NIMS. Another difference highlighted by the staff 
functions contained within DV 100 is the importance of information gathering and 
assessment, and a focus on personnel and communications; neither of these are 
included as staff functions within NIMS.110  These three areas of divergence 
illustrate potential opportunities that the United States could utilize to enhance 
command operations. 
 
Figure 6.   German Command Staff Functions (From DV 100) 
DV100 creates an environment open to innovation and encourages the 
involvement of experts and nongovernment agency partnerships. As an example 
of the strong public/private partnership, German NGOs, such as the Workers 
Samaritan Association, are responsible for aspects of disaster relief. In addition, 
the German command and control philosophy places a strong emphasis on both 
training and qualification. Often a bachelor’s degree is required and 24 months of 
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training promote operational competence.111  This level of required educational 
qualification is not often seen in the United States. This German focus on 
education carries through to the training expectations of command staff, as 
personnel are developed to be specialists within defined roles. 
The potential value that could be extracted by exporting some principles of 
DV 100 can best be found through examining the observations of experts that 
are familiar with both systems. In an effort to obtain a comparative perspective 
and provide evidence that these principles in both systems could create 
operational value, former New Hampshire State Fire Marshal and International 
Fire Service Consultant Don Bliss was contacted. Marshal Bliss has done 
extensive work with the German Fire Service and has served as a Fire Chief in 
several New England Communities. This cumulative experience provides a 
unique perspective that validates several points outlined within this analysis. In 
an interview on June 4, 2012, Marshal Bliss indicated that he believed the United 
States could benefit from implementing many of the principles contained in DV 
100.  
Specifically, Marshal Bliss noted,  
Operations produced through the use of DV100 tend to create more 
consistent and precise practices than are typical under incident 
command within the United States. The German system utilizes a 
military model that emphasizes education; advancement is based 
on training provided in a officer candidate school, and in many 
cases an officer would be well trained but may not have previously 
been a firefighter.112   
Advancement based strictly on education is contrary to the fire service 
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based systems can be compromised as the Incident Commander is often tasked 
with performing multiple functions that include requesting the resources 
necessary for the response.”113 
The comparative analysis detailed in the previous narrative, and within 
Table 1, provides an overview of divergence. These differences should be 
analyzed and evaluated to determine best practices, and the potential value of 
exporting these practices. Specifically, Germany could benefit from increased 
information sharing while the United States could benefit from moving past the 
rigidity of NIMS to a system more open to partnerships and a humanistic 
approach. Table 1 illustrates aspects of the two incident control methodologies: 
Table 1.   Delphi Observations Improvising and Adapting ICS 
Country United States Germany 
Command System National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) 
Dienstvorschrift 100 
Challenges Frequency of Use  
Confidence of command staff to 
fill high stress roles during surge 
events. 
Frequency of Use  
Confidence of command staff to fill 
high stress roles during surge 
events. 
Collaboration Emphasis on Incident 
Commander 




Structural Emphasis Emphasis on personnel 
Command Attitude 




Emphasis on patterns and cues Viewed as a negative trap that if 
utilized can create paralysis in 
abnormal situations   






NGO Partnerships Afterthought not viewed as a 
primary role 
Open to experts and NGOs 
NGOs perform 80 percent of disaster 
relief work 
 
Country United States Germany 
Training Sporadic and moderate in 
duration 
Bachelors required 
24 months for competence 
Specialization in staff functions 
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Incident control challenges both countries, and Germany could learn from 
the United States in terms of increasing information sharing between role 
divergent agencies, and recognizing that experience does have some value 
when facing the challenges of emergency response. As noted previously, 
Germany and the United States are divergent within governance, law and policy 
related to incident control. Divergence in crisis policy and incident control 
philosophy is a product of the evolution, threat experience and culture inherent to 
each country. Considering the German approach, the United States has the 
opportunity to move past the structure and rigidity presently in place. This 
comparative analysis is important to the IC in that it provides exposure to 
concepts integrated into a foreign IMS system. The ten ideas listed below are 
concepts that have been extracted from DV 100 and then submitted to the Delphi 
panel as a Round Three question that evaluated the potential value of integrating 
these concepts into NIMS: 
1. Development of partnerships with nontraditional 
organizations, such as NGOs and including both private 
corporations and clubs. As an example, partnerships with 
private corporations such as Home Depot or Walmart can 
provide supplies needed during the response to surge 
events; 
2. Development of a communications and transmission staff 
function; 
3. Development of a personnel and administration staff 
function; 
4. Development of an information gathering and assessment 
staff function; 
5. Development of computer-based command checklists; 
6. Move the command post to a fixed, off-site facility; 
7. Provide less structure and allow more creativity; 
8. Promote the automated response of incident support teams; 
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9. Development of situational analysis teams (dedicated 
personnel that focus on gathering and verifying information 
for the IC); 
10. Development of regional support teams. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This comparative analysis is utilized to distill ten concepts from DV 100 
that may enhance NIMS, if adopted in the United States. These ideas were 
utilized to inform the development of questions in the Round Three Delphi 
survey, which is presented in Chapter V. One theme consistently observed 
during this research process was the dedication of personnel and focus on 
mission that existed within each Country. 
The implementation of these concepts should be a subject of further 
research. Although these unique aspects of DV100 have the potential to inspire 
increased collaboration and greater effectiveness during the response to 
nonroutine surge events, additional evaluation is required to establish how these 
concepts would integrate within the NIMS IMS system. Consideration should be 
given to what second and third order effects would develop should these 
practices be introduced as a component of American NIMS.  
The majority of the potential innovations derived from DV 100 would have 
to be developed and integrated into operations on a regional level. This is a 
particularly difficult task as the federalist principles of American governance place 
authority at the local level. Regional collaborative groups typically consist of 
informal professional associations that link multiple jurisdictions. Ultimately, these 
regional groups promote shared goals that emerge through a consensus 
process.  
The political environment of these regional entities produce an 
environment where personalities, social relationships, and the need for 
consensus dominate over more formal organizational power structures that exist 
on the local level. Although informal, these regional fire service associations are 
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brought together by the emergence of shared values and the desire to create a 
synergy in which the group can accomplish more through collaboration than a 
single agency could accomplish on its own. As members of these groups often 
work together during emergency response, a shared interdependence is created. 
Thus, regional associations may already demonstrate some of the more 
humanistically-based approaches that are key aspects of the foundation of DV 
100. 
As change is often a difficult process, strategic implementation will need to 
focus on collaboration. The literature presented in Chapter II agrees that 
interdependence creates a shared purpose and the determination of a joint 
mission. Working as a team creates an environment that supports intelligent 
improvisation, which may lead to the development of new strategic options and 
solutions necessary to mitigate nonroutine surge events.  
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IV. METHODS AND RESULTS—DELPHI ROUND ONE SURVEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this thesis is to provide tangible guidance that can help 
Incident Commanders optimize decision making during the initial hours of the 
response to surge incidents.114 This chapter describes the research method 
utilized to gather and analyze data for the two research questions that listed 
below:  
1. As emergency incidents expand toward the chaotic context, 
what symptoms, patterns and cues exist to indicate that a different method 
of decision making is necessary? 
2. What strategies can be utilized to enhance decision making 
during the initial response to chaotic surge incidents?   
The literature review indicates that as surge incidents become 
unpredictable, unfamiliar and chaotic, Incident Commanders can become 
overwhelmed. During these asymmetric events, signals predict the 
transformation into the chaotic context of the Cynefin Framework115. As events 
transition, decision-making methodologies, beyond the closed system of incident 
command, need to be considered in an effort to produce optimal results.  
The literature review presented in Chapter II is used to inform questions 
that were incorporated into a three-round Delphi survey that was distributed to 
National Fire Academy (NFA), Executive Fire Officer Program (EFOP) Graduates 
or CFOs that participate in the Massachusetts Fire Incident Reporting System 
(MFIRS). Based on the prerequisites defined above, survey participants are  
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considered subject matter experts. The responses to the first round of the Delphi 
survey are analyzed and coded for themes that are delineated and interpreted in 
this chapter. 
B. DELPHI METHOD 
The Delphi survey method was developed by Rand Corporation in the 
1950s as a tool for knowledge building.116  The Delphi technique is a systematic, 
interactive forecasting method that facilitates a panel of geographically dispersed 
experts to support judgmental and heuristic decision making when a lack of 
agreement or an incomplete state of knowledge exists.117  Based on the principle 
that forecasts from a structured group of experts, they are more accurate than 
data obtained from unstructured groups or individuals.  
A Delphi survey process harnesses the subject matter expertise of 
selected participants to deal systematically with a complex problem or task.118 
This method is selected based on the opportunity to work with expert fire service 
leaders to identify tangible solutions to a complex problem faced exclusively by 
emergency response practitioners. This technique provided the benefits of 
anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback, and statistical aggregation. 
During a Delphi process, a first round survey is formulated and distributed. 
After the first round survey is closed, the response is summarized and utilized to 
construct the second round survey. This process is repeated during subsequent 
rounds and provides participants the opportunity to reflect on the comprehensive 
feedback of the whole group.119  The Delphi process consists of two distinct 
phases. The first phase is the exploration stage where the subject is fully  
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discussed. The second phase is the evaluation stage, which is used to gather 
expert thoughts and perceptions on various ways to address the issues under 
investigation.120 
C. DEMOGRAPHICS AND SELECTION CRITERIA 
Candidates selected were seasoned, and CFOs (between the age of 35 
and 65) that have demonstrated experience in the response to surge incidents. 
The initial selection of participants is based on completion of the National Fire 
Academies EFOP or participation in the MFIRS. These professionals are 
regarded as experienced experts within the field of emergency response.  
It should be noted that candidates needed to be members of the American 
Fire Service but were not constrained from participation by a specific agency 
affiliation. The majority of the participants were located within New England. 
However, in an effort to provide balance, three participants were specifically 
recruited from other regions of the Country. All survey respondents were polled 
only on technical input on research questions. All questions addressed areas of 
expertise not opinion. 
The survey was sent to a group of 32 CFOs, as defined above. The 
respondents were polled using an online survey tool. Initially phone calls were 
placed to potential participants, if these professionals agreed to participate in the 
survey process, an introductory email was sent on May 6, 2012, to provide 
context, assign a coded control number and confirm agreement to participate in 
the process. On May 7, 2012, the confirmation email was followed by the actual 
link to the First Round Survey and the request to complete it within two weeks. 
The confirmation email is found in Appendix B. The response rate was initially 
moderate, so two reminder emails were sent over the final week of the survey 
period. The survey was closed on May 22, 2012, two weeks after being 
distributed. Thirty of the thirty-two potential participants (94 percent) responded. 
                                            
120 Adler, Gazing into the Oracle, 9. 
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D. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND ONE:  INSTRUMENTATION 
Questions for Round One of the Delphi survey were formulated based on 
both on the themes identified within the literature review, as presented in Chapter 
II. As the survey was drafted, it was piloted tested with several experienced 
CFOs from outside of the sample to clarify the intent and wording of the 
questions in the survey. The pilot process resulted in light editing of the questions 
in the survey. The first round questions were framed to identify signals that 
indicate that an emergency situation is moving beyond the expected and 
becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar, or chaotic.  
The first round consisted of ten quantitative and qualitative questions. This 
included three demographic question and seven questions that addressed the 
two broad categories of: (1) identification of signals, (2) adaption of decision-
making methodologies. Qualitative questions allowed the respondents to provide 
specific examples of their perceptions, observations and strategic adaptations to 
surge events. Six questions focused on the identification of the signals of incident 
transformation. The final two questions addressed the need for strategic adaption 
of decision-making processes based on the presence and or absence of the 
signals identified by the respondents. 
The survey was implemented using Survey Monkey, an online survey tool. 
The questions that were asked in Round One can be found in Appendix C. 
Example of a demographic question and an open-ended question are contained 
in Table 2. The first two questions were administrative, reiterating agreement to 
participate in the survey and asking for the entry of the participant’s coded control 
number. The third and fourth questions queried the level of experience of the 
participants. The fifth question asked what position within the Incident Command 
System (ICS) that participants typically fill. Seven open-ended questions 
followed. The sixth question asked for the signals that an emergency incident is 
moving beyond the expected and becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar and 
chaotic. The seventh asked participants to identify benchmarks associated with 
incident transformation, as detailed above. The next two questions asked 
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respondents to use their experience to identify signals that an incident was in the 
process of transition toward the nonroutine. The next two questions asked 
participants about the absence of signals. The final question addressed whether 
and how respondents alter decision-making strategies as an incident becomes 
unfamiliar and unpredictable. 
Table 2.   Delphi Survey Round One Sample Questions 
 





3. How many years of fire service experience do you have? 
 
o Less than 15 years 
o 15–19 years 
o 20–24 years 
o 25–29 years 
o 30–34 years 





1. What are the signals that an emergency situation is moving 
beyond the expected and becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar 
or chaotic? 
 
Please list out the factors or signals that you have observed or 
experienced and provide as much information as possible. 
 
 
Following the principles of the Delphi method, the results were analyzed 
and an overview was provided to the respondents, and some of the findings were 
summarized and used to inform the development of Round Two questions. The 
results of Round One are presented and discussed below. 
E. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND ONE:  RESULTS 
This section presents each question from Round One and the results 
obtained. The Round One Survey was focused on identifying signals that indicate  
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that an emergency situation is moving beyond the expected and becoming 
unpredictable, unfamiliar or chaotic. Data were summarized based on themes 
identified in participant responses. 
F. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. Years of Fire Service Experience  
Participants were asked to identify their fire service experience. Choices 
presented were: less than 15 years, 15–19 years, 20–24 years, 25–29 years, 30–
34 years and 35 or more years. All of the respondents indicated that they had 15 
or more years of service. Overall, 63.4 percent of participants had 30 or more 
years of fire service experience. The statistical breakdown is detailed in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Round One Sample -- Years of Fire Service 
Years of Service Response Percentage 
Response Count 
15–19 Years 3.3% 1 
20–24 years 16.7% 5 
25–29 years 16.7% 5 
30–34 years 36.7% 11 
35 or more than years 26.7% 8 
Number of respondents = 30 
2. Years of Experience as a Command Officer 
Participants were asked to select the range of command experience 
appropriate to their length of service. Choices presented were: less than less 
than 5 years, 5–9 years, 10–14 years, 15–19 years, 20–24 years and 25 or more 
years. Overall, 87 percent of respondents have a minimum of 10 years of 
command experience, and 57 percent have over 15 years of command 
experience. The breakdown is detailed in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Round One Sample – Years of Command Experience 
Years of Service Response Percentage Response Count 
Less than 5 years 3.3% 1 
5–9 years 10.0% 3 
10–14 years 30.0% 9 
15–19 years 
26.7% 8 
20–24 years 13.3% 4 
25 or more than years 16.7% 5 
Number of respondents = 30 
3. Command Position Most Frequently Held 
Participants were asked to identify what position within the incident 
command system they typically fill. Choices presented were: Incident 
Commander, Operations Section Chief, Safety Officer, Planning Section Chief, 
Logistics Section Chief, and “other.” Ninety percent of respondents indicated that 
they typically serve in the role of Incident Commander (IC). One participant 
selected “other” and indicated that he typically functions as a Branch Manager or 
agency representative. The statistical breakdown is detailed in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Round One Sample – Most Frequent Command Position 
Position Typically Filled Response Percentage Response Count 
Incident Commander 90.0% 27 
Operations Section Chief 3.3% 1 
Safety Officer 3.3% 1 
Planning Section Chief 0% 0 
Logistics Section Chief 0% 0 
Other position 3.3% 1 
Number of respondents = 30 
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G. SIGNS, SYMPTOMS AND IDENTIFICATION OF CHAOTIC INCIDENTS 
Questions Six and Seven asked respondents to identify signals and 
benchmarks that an event was becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar, and chaotic. 
Based on the similarity of these two questions, the analysis of responses was 
consolidated. The two questions are listed below: 
6. What are the signals that an emergency situation is moving 
beyond the expected and becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar 
or chaotic?  
7. ICS often uses benchmarks to determine incident progression 
or mitigation. As an incident unfolds, the situation can become 
chaotic, what benchmarks tell you that you have reached this 
point? 
These questions sought to develop an inventory of signals and 
benchmarks that respondents have experienced during their careers. 
Participants were asked to identify signals and benchmarks that an emergency is 
moving beyond the expected and becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar or chaotic. 
One hundred percent of respondents answered Questions Six and 97.6 percent 
of respondents answered Question Seven.  
Analysis of the responses to these open-ended questions focused on the 
identification of common themes. . As the data were analyzed, I noted that some 
of the responses referenced the specifics of the emergency situation. Other 
responses referred to aspects of the command structure. The final response 
category focused on aspects that pertained directly to first responders. As the 
response data were analyzed, 18 themes emerged across both Questions Six 
and Seven. Themes were sorted by frequency with the most frequent response 
selected listed at the top of the table. Results are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   Thematic Responses Identifying Signals of Incident Transformation 
 





Insufficient resources 26 
Strained command structure (lack of structure, unable to manage 
roles) 
19 
Lack of progress (situation escalates, unable to complete 
assignments) 
19 
Overwhelmed (anxiety, confusion) 15 
Lack of sufficient information (situational analysis) 14 
Safety compromise (loss of accountability, mayday call, victim or 
firefighter injury) 
12 
Managed by incident (reactive nature emerges, abandon SOPs 
and or preplans) 
11 
Problems with situation reports (increased or decreased volume 
observations don’t match reports, inadequate content) 
11 
Loss of responder composure (paralysis, frustration and or 
errors) 
10 
Communications strain / breakdown 9 
Unfamiliar / unexpected occurrences (odd requests, lack of 
similar experience, smoke conditions, structural compromise) 
9 
Time expectations exceeded 8 
Multiple decision points/priorities (multiple operational 
site/incidents) 
8 
Need to redeploy resources (defensive posture) 6 
Lack of teamwork (freelancing) 5 
Command inundated with information (external concerns) 4 
Sense of urgency (intuition, voice modulation) 3 
Complex operations/structure 1 
Number of respondents = 30 
 
The variety of participant responses provide insight into how experienced 
command officers form the perception that events are becoming nonroutine. This 
information is important, as RPD indicates that decisions are made based  
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upon patterns and cues as a precursor to decision making.121   Providing this 
information to ICs can expand their inventory of cues using RPD. Five themes 
occurred most frequently:.  
• Insufficient resources 
• Strained command structure including the inability to manage roles 
• Lack of progress in incident stabilization  
• Overwhelmed personnel marked by anxiety or confusion within the 
command staff 
• Lack of sufficient information and situational awareness 
The most common theme presented was that the lack of sufficient 
resources. This is not surprising given the scope of response required for surge 
events, as it is not feasible to have sufficient resources available to address 
these very rare situations. This means that resources are not immediately 
available to match the size and scope of the emergency event.  
First response agencies across America are geared to confront the typical 
volume and scope of incidents that frequently occur within the organization’s 
respective jurisdiction. When surge events occur, response extends beyond the 
capability of a single agency. In these cases, communities rely on mutual aid 
from adjacent communities. Surge events typically exhaust local mutual aid and 
require a longer response of distal resources that may not be immediately 
available. The four quotes below provide a variety of thoughts on this theme: 
Based on an assessment of the situation being faced, it is 
determined that the number of resources at the scene or already 
en-route will not be sufficient to manage the situation.  
The most common benchmark for reaching the "chaotic" point in an 
event from my experience is when the request or need for 
resources exceeds the available resources. Decisions have to be 
made at both the command level and at the tactical level as to what 
                                            
121 Klein, Recognition-Primed, 139. 
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missions we can and will respond to and which missions we 
cannot. My observations of this includes the 911 center advising 
that requests for services are being stacked up and triaged, and or 
loss of utilities to key infrastructure, and declarations of a ‘local 
state of emergency.’ 
Time is against you. Primary resources are near depletion. 
What is concerning is when the "normal" chaos becomes 
something other than that, some of those benchmarks would be: 
Exhausting all local and regional resources, additional assistance 
will need to come from further away and will be operating 
completely out of their "normal' area and that may create some 
operational issues. 
The command structure provides the basis for organization of incident 
objectives. Frequent indicators that an incident is escalating toward the 
unexpected include both a strained command structure and personnel that are 
overwhelmed. Responses indicated that as a surge incident escalates, a lack of 
adequate command staff can produce an environment in which the Incident 
Commander is unable to manage or process the multiple decision points that 
require immediate attention.  As first responding crews arrive on the scene of an 
overwhelming event, pursing tactical goals at the expense of creating a 
command structure adversely affects the development of a coordinated plan to 
mitigate the situation. The following four quotes illustrate this point: 
The Incident Commander is unable to manage all of the functions 
and begins to expand and delegate roles. The signals are that the 
Incident Commander of designated staff are becoming 
overwhelmed. 
Loss of control, lack of reports and updates, insufficient resource 
tracking and tasks assigned. 
Commanders will abandon efforts to coordinate overall operations 
and ignore the development of operations that are not in sync. 
When personnel lose their control to remain in the command 
structure, such as radio traffic becoming uncontrollable, units self-
deploying, or the IC losing contact with a unit or multiple units. 
There are also times when a lot of mutual aid is called and the  
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command structure has not been setup to handle it, this is indicated 
when the IC becomes barraged by mutual aid officers making 
suggestions on the operation. 
Lack of progress in mitigating an incident represents another common 
situation that occurs during the evolution of surge incidents. Analysis of the data 
indicates that failure to make expected progress serves as a frequent warning 
sign that the event may be more serious than anticipated based on initial 
observation. The following two quotes illustrate this point: 
The incident is escalating much more rapidly than initial responders 
can take control or mitigation action. 
An inability for various assigned/deployed resources to complete 
their assignments/missions within normal accepted time frames. No 
discernible progress on incident control/mitigation within several 
short, normally reasonable operational progress periods, i.e., 15 
minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes, etc. An ongoing need to quickly 
deploy resources that you do not have available to critical incident 
tasks/assignments. A belief that you will be playing "catch up" for 
an extended period of time and conversely an inability to "get 
ahead" of the incident. 
Command personnel are often overwhelmed by the magnitude and 
complexity of these rare and unfamiliar situations. Responses indicate that when 
personnel are overwhelmed, decision making can be compromised by the 
inability to process information. Although 15 respondents noted that they 
interpreted personnel being overwhelmed as a clear signal that the incident was 
becoming unpredictable and chaotic, no specific comments provided tangible 
examples of this phenomenon. 
The lack of situational awareness may mask the scope and intensity of the 
situation that responders are facing. Information pertaining to an event forms the 
foundation of action and the basis to make informed decisions. The lack of 
sufficient information inhibits the ability to fully assess a situation and was 
perceived by many respondents to be the key situation-based signal that events 
are moving toward the nonroutine. The following three quotes illustrate the 
importance of this point: 
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Accurate information assessment is difficult to obtain. 
Unable to get a “complete picture” of the problem. i.e., a lack of 
information as to what exactly has happened or is happening. No 
clear picture as to how much worse the incident will get. 
Commanders will delay making decisions awaiting more 
information 
Questions Eight and Nine further explore respondent’s experiences in an 
effort to identify signals that an event that an event is falling out of the ordinary. 
Based on the similarity of these two questions, the analysis of responses was 
consolidated. The two questions are listed below: 
8. Think about your experience responding to a routine single-
family residential structure fire. Imagine that the situation is 
showing signs of becoming nonroutine (falling out of the 
ordinary). What are the signals that alert you to this transition. 
9. Pick a situation that you experienced where a routine event 
surged into a complex or nonroutine situation. What were the 
signs of this transformation? 
Question Eight asked participants to use their experience responding to a 
single-family residential structure fire to identify signals that this incident was 
becoming nonroutine in the areas of fireground activity, incident progression and 
personal decision making. Question Nine asked a related question. In addition, 
respondents were encouraged to identify signals that did not fall within the 
categories of fire-ground/emergency scene activity, incident progression and 
personal decision making. Two participants skipped Question Eight and two 
participants skipped Question Nine. One hundred percent of the participants that 
answered Question Eight provided inputs into each of the three categories 
identified and 67.9 percent provided signals they felt were outside of the three 
categories. Ninety-four point six percent of participants that answered Question 
Nine provided input into each of the three categories identified and 64.3 percent 
provided input that did not conform to one of the three categories.  
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Thematic labels were developed to code responses for both Questions 
Eight and Nine. Data presented is sorted to show the most frequent themes at 
the top of the table. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 7: 
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Table 7.   Responses Identifying Signs of Incident Transformation 
Emergency Scene Activity Incident Progression Personal Decision making 
Lack of progress (situation 
escalates, unable to complete 
assignments) 
Lack of progress (situation 
escalates, unable to 
complete assignments) 
Command inundated with 





Lack of sufficient information 
(situational analysis) 
Problems with situation reports 
(increased or decreased volume 
observations don’t match 





Insufficient resources  Insufficient resources  Multiple decision points/priorities 
(multiple operational 
site/incidents) 
Sense of urgency (intuition, 
voice modulation) 
Unfamiliar / unexpected 
occurrences (odd 




Sense of urgency (intuition, 
voice modulation) 
Unfamiliar / unexpected 
occurrences (odd requests, lack 




structure (lack of structure, 
unable to manage roles) 
Communications strain / 
breakdown 
Safety compromise (loss of 
accountability, mayday call, 
victim or firefighter injury) 
Command inundated with 
information (external 
concerns) 
Complex operations/structure  
Managed by incident (reactive 
nature emerges, abandon SOPs 




Managed by incident (reactive 
nature emerges, abandon SOPs 
and or preplans) 
Lack of teamwork (freelancing)  Need to redeploy resources 
(defensive posture) 
Multiple decision points/priorities 
(multiple operational 
site/incidents) 
 High risk decisions (risk based 
analysis) 
Complex operations/structure   Unfamiliar / unexpected 
occurrences (odd requests, lack 
of similar experience, smoke 
conditions, structural 
compromise) 
  Lack of progress (situation 
escalates, unable to complete 
assignments) 
  Strained command structure 
(lack of structure, unable to 
manage roles) 
Number of respondents = 28 
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The variety of participant responses provide insight into how experienced 
command officers utilize experience to form the perception that events are 
becoming nonroutine. Several themes have been listed in multiple categories. 
This overlap indicates that a signal theme can apply to multiple aspects of 
emergency response. As an example, the theme entitled lack of sufficient 
resources was noted in all three categories. This indicates that a lack of sufficient 
resources impacts fireground/emergency scene activity, incident progression and 
personal decision making. The observations of participants are detailed within 
each category. The most frequently selected overlapping themes are listed 
below: 
• Lack of progress (situation escalates, unable to complete 
assignments) 
• Overwhelmed (anxiety, confusion) 
• Insufficient resources 
• Unfamiliar / unexpected occurrences (odd requests, lack of similar 
experience, smoke conditions, structural compromise) 
• Multiple decision points/priorities (multiple operational 
site/incidents) 
All five of these themes were also noted in the analysis of Questions Six 
and Seven. This indicates a developing consistency in term of the themes 
presented in this thesis. 
1. Fireground / Emergency Scene Activity   
The initial response to surge events places insufficient resources against 
an expansive, unfamiliar and unexpected situation. Often the lack of similar 
experience creates the potential for the IC to be surprised by unfamiliar and or 
unexpected occurrences. This environment often overwhelms responders as 
they try to avoid being managed by the incident and produce a pattern of 
response actions that allow them to get ahead of the progression of the situation.  
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In these situations, crews operating on the incident scene and command 
personnel often become frustrated by the lack of progress they achieve in 
mitigating the incident. These chaotic events serve as a breeding ground for 
confusion, as there is often a lack of complete and correct information. Incidents 
of this magnitude require the IC to face multiple, often opposing, decision points 
and priorities. This frequently occurs when a situation creates multiple incident or 
operating sites. As an example, the over pressurization of a natural gas line has 
the potential to produce fires and leaks at several locations. These challenges 
can produce an environment in which a lack of direction leads to crews 
functioning as individual units rather than as a coordinated team. Pertinent 
responses that illustrate a lack of progress as a signal of a surge event are listed 
below: 
No progress is being made and ICS starts to unravel. Safety is 
being compromised. 
 
Situation reports from various areas of the incident indicate a 
deterioration of the situation. 
 
People are overwhelmed and have difficulty making correct 
decisions toward mitigation, this decreases the safety of personnel. 
 
Confusion in strategies and tactics, offensive and defensive actions 
occurring simultaneously. 
 
Initial units arriving on scene have difficulty in getting even initial 
tasks completed effectively. 
2. Incident Progression 
As surge incidents occur infrequently, the prior experience of first 
responders is easily exceeded, and members of the command staff are often 
surprised with the complexity of these unfamiliar situations. Facing the 
unexpected creates a level of both anxiety and uncertainty as personnel struggle 
to determine the best actions to confront these unfamiliar situations. During 
routine events, conditions are expected to improve over time as tactics result in 
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the mitigation of the situation. Surge events are typically marked by operations 
that extend over abnormal periods of time without improvement in conditions. 
Marked by a lack of progress, these incidents produce a complex operating 
environment that can easily overwhelm command staff. The lack of sufficient 
resources, coupled with the complexity of what is often a chaotic situation, leads 
responders to take substantial risk; this can result in a loss of personnel 
accountability and safety on the incident scene. Illustrative responses are listed 
below: 
Percentage of involvement increasing rather than decreasing. 
 
The incident continuing to grow beyond our prior experiences. 
 
Lack of progress controlling the incident, having to triage and ration 
our response. 
 
As time progressed, the problem is not being solved. Chain of 
command asking for additional resources. 
 
Personnel have uncertainty of what is going on. 
 
Living in an area not prone to flooding, the 100 year storm took 
everyone by surprise. 
3. Personal Decision Making 
Emergency situations are subject to uncertainty and time pressure and 
often produce an environment in which multiple decision points require 
immediate attention. Surge events amplify these pressures and in the absence of 
familiar patterns and cues can elicit a reactive command structure that is basing 
decisions on inappropriate experiences. Two themes dominate participant 
responses within the category of personal decision making. First, a lack of 
situational awareness serves as a significant theme, as first responders may not 
be able to easily evaluate the entire situation based on either a lack of 
information or an abundance of information that cannot be quickly evaluated. 
Second, personnel are often overwhelmed by the scope and magnitude of the 
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event. These unique situations suggest the presence of unfamiliar or unexpected 
occurrences including odd requests. Pertinent responses are listed below: 
 
Risk based analysis shows signs that are outside the norm. 
 
Overwhelming amount of information being delivered in short time 
period. 
 
Personnel are requesting many actions to occur and need 
additional resources. 
 
Delays in decision making because of being overwhelmed with 
requests from subordinates, lack of accurate information, or rapidly 
evolving events. 
 
Feeling a need to move more quickly with a sense of urgency. This 
can be a problem in my experience because I believe that slower 





Fully reactive and not ahead of current operations. 
 
The sense that I don’t have the complete picture of what is going 
on. 
 
The inability to see the big picture at the start of the incident made 
decision making difficult. We needed additional command staff to 
feed information to the Incident Commander. 
 
Persons with knowledge of the dangers of the situation were 
moving clear of the area. 
4. Other Signals 
Questions Eight and Nine allowed respondents to provide a list of signals 
that are not confined to the three categories listed above. Personal intuition was 
presented as an intangible signal that an event is becoming nonroutine. 
However, the capability, capacity and reaction of the command staff was the 
primary focus of the responses within this category. Reactions to these 
infrequent events include anxiety, stress, fatigue and the need to pause to collect 
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thoughts. This suggests that stress management and coping skills are critical 
success factors when facing the intensity of surge events. Illustrative responses 
are listed below: 
Staff getting stressed, fatigued and taking actions beyond SOP's. 
 
An anxiety level is evident in the voices on the radio 
communications. 
 
Plans and resources are not effectively resolving the issue at hand. 
 
Gut Feeling, uneasy about the situation, dry mouth. 
 
Having to take a breath to collect my thoughts and become 
grounded. 
 
Too many tasks, not enough personnel. 
H. THE ABSENCE OF SIGNALS 
1. Expected Signals That Were Not Present 
Participants were asked to reflect on the situation envisioned in Question 
Nine and identify the absence of expected signals. Two participants skipped this 
question. Forty-six point four percent of respondents indicated that they had 
expected to see signals that were absent. Seven respondents provided clarifying 
responses. Four of these respondents identified that the lack of exterior signs of 
fire spread, including the smoke generation, was the expected signal most 
frequently absent as situations escalate. The three other responses described 
the absence of critical communications and lack of engagement of operational 
personnel. Examples of responses that indicated expected signals that did not 
appear include the following: 
I expected someone else to communicate that conditions were 
becoming untenable, or that they needed more resources. 
No exterior signs of fire or pressurized smoke. 
 
In this incident there was an acid plume. One expects a plume to 
be a green cloud that is clearly defined and obvious. In this case, 
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the plume was large and dangerous but appeared to be normal 
steam, or a fog or cloud like mist. It almost looked like a normal 
situation. 
2. Reaction to the Absence of Signals 
Participants were asked to reflect on Question Ten and identify their 
reaction to the absence of expected signals. Seventeen respondents skipped this 
question, and thirteen respondents provided open-ended input and the themes 
as outlined in Table 8.  
Table 8.    Reaction to the Absence of Expected Signals 
Reaction to the absence of expected signals Frequency of 
response 
Fell back to a safer strategy 3 
Requested additional resources 3 
Accepted recommendations of others (fire service 
personnel or outside experts) 
2 
Altered tactics 1 
Created a staging area to control resources 1 
Number of respondents = 13 
 
Responses to this question included several actions designed to provide 
operational safety and prudent tactics. Responses focused on the need to 
regroup or reorganize to adapt to the demanding conditions presented by the 
incident. The development of a staging area provides the IC with both a central 
resource pool and the time to think about the best strategic options. Collaboration 
with other members and subject matter experts were presented as options 
relative to how to deal with the absence of expected signals. Examples of 
responses that indicated changes in strategic action include the following:  
Created a staging location and instructed all units that any 
response will be deployed through the Staging Officer. 
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I accepted the recommendation of the Interior Operations Officer. 
 
Operations ordered more ventilation which eventually revealed the 
fire. 
 
The gas company representative was my subject matter expert. I 
felt quite uneasy to not take the steps that I wanted to take but I 
had to trust that his experience in this matter far exceeded any 
experience that I had. 
I. DECISION-MAKING METHODOLOGY 
1. Altered Decision making as Incidents Become Unpredictable 
Participants were asked if they utilize different decision-making strategies 
as an incident becomes unfamiliar and unpredictable. One participant skipped 
this question. Seventy-two point four percent of respondents indicated that they 
do alter their decision-making strategies as incidents escalate. Those who 
responded cited eight different strategies that they would employ. These 
strategies are outlined from highest to lowest frequency of response. A 
breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 9: 
Table 9.   Changes in Decision-making Strategies 
 
Altered Decision-making Strategies 
Frequency of 
response 
Collaboration – opinions and experts 6 
Assign personnel to coordinate – additional command resources 4 
Self preservation/defensive strategy 4 
Seek assistance from those with experience 4 
Bring in additional command resources – senior staff – mutual 
aid chiefs 
3 
Verify information from more than one source 3 
Continually reevaluate the situation and potential courses of 
action  
2 
Maintain risk vs. gain strategic approach 1 
Number of respondents = 29 
 67 
Although the majority of Incident Commanders indicated that they would 
alter their decision-making methodology, 27.6 percent of respondents indicated 
that they would not alter their decision making. Affirmative responses indicated 
that they would pursue adaptive strategies and consider increasing collaborative 
efforts, and information verification.  As events evolve, the lack of sufficient 
command staff is logistical problem, as it takes time to assemble appropriate 
personnel. Participants indicated that command resources would be increased, 
and the support of CFOs from mutual aid communities would be utilized as an 
adaptive tool.  
Examples of responses include the following: 
I try and seek out people that have a specialty in this area. 
 
I would look to experts to assist me in making decisions. 
 
Attempted to verify information from more than one source. 
 
I look to other officers to assist in evaluating and interpreting the 
incident. 
 
I use the help and support of mutual aid chiefs who have 
responded to the incident. 
 
I call upon additional command resources for assistance and 
expand the number of personnel assigned to the command post. 
Surge events are often high-stake situations where the lives of both 
civilians and first responders are at risk. Considering the strategic approach of 
measuring risk against gain, several responses projected a conservative 
approach in which resources would reformulate into a safer defensive position. 
Reflecting a change toward the theme of collaboration, several respondents 
indicated that they would add command staff and seek assistance from those 
with either expertise or experience.  
Examples of responses include the following: 
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I changed from the tactical strategy of trying to suppress the fire to 
the strategic view of self-preservation (protecting my firefighters 
from danger). 
 
If I believe the incident is not acting as I would predict, I step back , 
use a defensive strategy and reevaluate the situation. 
My approach to decision making is much more conservative and a 
more thought out process. 
 
 I think that it is important to keep reassessing the situation. 
Stepping back and getting additional input on what is going on. 
 
I try to maintain a risk vs. gain approach based on the resources 
available. 
J. CONCLUSION 
Demonstrating a pattern of consistency, three of the top five themes 
presented through the analysis of Questions Eight and Nine are within the top 
five themes presented in the analysis of Questions Six and Seven. These three 
signals of chaos include; lack of progress in incident stabilization, overwhelmed, 
and insufficient resources. This level of consistency presents a compelling case 
for the importance of these signals. Two other themes noted in the analysis of all 
four questions included the presence of both multiple time sensitive decision 
points and the presence of unfamiliar or unexpected occurrences. 
Four additional signals demonstrated a strong rate of response. Many 
respondents viewed the presence of a high level of situational awareness as a 
precursor to effective decision making. The lack of sufficient information during 
chaotic situations was routinely identified as a signal that emergency situations 
were exceeding the routine. This trend and the need for a continuous stream of 
reliable information was demonstrated across multiple questions. Surge events 
exceed normal operations and produce unfamiliar and unexpected occurrences. 
This lack of the familiar is often manifested by odd requests, a recognition of a 
lack of similar experience or by physical conditions on the incident scene. 
Another trend was the indication that surge events are marked by a strained 
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command structure as commanders face the need to rapidly address multiple 
decision points or manage operations at multiple locations. 
The majority of respondents indicated that they would alter their decision-
making methods when they observed the signals associated with the transition 
toward the nonroutine or chaotic. The primary adjustments were to increase the 
level of collaboration and add resources to the command structure in an effort to 
enhance the command and control of operations. As life safety is the primary 
concern of the American Fire Service, transition toward more conservative or 
defensive strategies that removed personnel from substation risk was common. 
Finally, respondents indicate the need to continually evaluate the situation and 
employ a strategy that balances risk and gain. 
The identification of signals described above, or in some cases the 
absence of expected signals, are indicators that an incident is becoming 
emergent. Providing an inventory of these signals to ICs provides the fireground 
commander with a new resource that can enhance decision making by allowing 
the IC to anticipate incident transition. As the majority of respondents indicated 
that they would alter their decision making as an incident becomes unfamiliar and 
chaotic, the identification of signals that matter is critical to developing an 
anticipatory as opposed to a reactive response strategy. Gladwell states that the 
unconscious mind finds patterns in situations based on very narrow slices of 
experience.122  Through the identification of signals that matter, this thesis 
informs ICs with the thin slices of experience that can enhance decision making, 
as they face unfamiliar surge events. 
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V. METHODS AND RESULTS—DELPHI ROUND TWO SURVEY 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS AND SELECTION CRITERIA 
The survey was sent to the same panel of 32 experts that agreed to 
participate in the Round One Delphi Survey. The respondents were once again 
polled using Survey Monkey, an online survey tool. On June 15, 2012, the link to 
the Second Round Survey was sent to participants who were asked to complete 
the survey within two weeks. The response rate was initially moderate; a 
reminder email was sent during the final week of the survey period. The survey 
was closed on June 29, 2012, two weeks after being distributed. Twenty of the 
thirty-two potential participants (63 percent) responded. 
B. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND TWO:  INSTRUMENTATION 
Questions for Round Two of the Delphi survey were formulated based on 
the themes identified within the literature review as presented in Chapter II, and 
the results of the Round One Survey detailed in Chapter IV. The Round Two 
Survey Draft was pilot tested with several experienced CFOs from outside of the 
sample to clarify the intent and wording of the questions in the survey. The pilot 
process resulted in light editing of the questions in the survey. The second round 
questions were framed to rank the relative importance of signals identified in 
round one and identify concepts that would improve strategic decision making 
during the initial response to surge incidents.  
The second round consisted of quantitative and qualitative questions that 
addressed two broad categories: (1) identification of strategic options to enhance 
decision making in surge events, and (2) identification of adaptive behaviors and 
creative ways in which improvisation will improve the effectiveness of response 
efforts. The survey was implemented using Survey Monkey, an online survey 
tool. The questions that were asked in Round Two can be found in Appendix C. 
One example of one rating and one open-ended question is contained in Table  
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10. The first two questions were administrative reiterating agreement to 
participate in the survey and asking for the entry of the participant’s coded control 
number. .  
Questions Three through Five were open-ended queries about the 
strategies the respondents use to compensate during the initial period of surge 
incident response. Question Six was a qualitative question that asked 
respondents to produce a narrative that identified strategies to filter the 
overwhelming amount of information that is frequently directed at the IC. The 
next two questions were quantitative questions that asked respondents to rate 
the relative importance of the eighteen signals that were identified in Round One 
and then choose their top five. The final two questions asked whether NIMS is an 
optimal response model, followed by a qualitative description of how NIMS could 















Table 10.   Delphi Survey Round Two Sample Questions 
 
Quantitative and Qualitative Question Examples from 




7. As a reminder during the first survey, you 
were asked to identify signals that an event is 
becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar or chaotic. 
Analysis of the responses to round one 
identified 18 themes by consolidating similar 
responses. As an example, responses 
including stress on the Incident Commander, 
anxiety, confusion, and dry mouth were 
consolidated into the theme of “overwhelmed.” 
 
The following listing summarizes the response 
from the group of participants and identifies 18 
themes, which are listed from highest to lowest 
in terms of response frequency. Please rate 
each of the items below in terms of how 
important the signal would be to you in terms of 
indicating a situation is becoming unpredictable 
or chaotic. [Rating scale 1 = not important to 6 






9. Given the previously identified signals that a 
situation is becoming unpredictable, unfamiliar 
or chaotic, what decision aids would enable 
improved confidence and capabilities in 
responding to that situation? Decision aids can 
include tools for information gathering, 
situational analysis, decision-making 
processes, etc. You can draw on best practice 
experience or think about the time(s) you have 
said “if only we had…” it would have helped 




C. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND TWO:  RESULTS 
This section presents each question from Round Two and the results 
obtained. The Round Two Survey focused on the identification of strategies and 
behaviors that can enhance response efforts during the initial response to surge 
incidents. Qualitative responses  were analyzed to identify themes and then all 
responses were categorized according to those themes.  
D. STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE RESPONSE 
1. Strategies to Get Ahead of the Event and Address a Lack of 
Resources 
Questions Three and Five asked respondents to identify adaptive 
strategies used in the face of surge events. Based on the similarity of these two 
questions, the analysis of responses was consolidated. The two questions are 
listed below: 
3. Surge events require more resources than are readily 
available. When encountering surge events such as a Mass 
Casualty Incident (MCI) what strategies do you employ to get 
ahead of the event? 
5. Often during chaotic events, the first few hours of response 
lack the required resource capability, how do you 
compensate? 
These questions sought to develop an inventory of strategies that 
respondents have utilized when faced with an emergent surge event. Participants 
were asked to identify strategies that have helped them address the lack of 
readily available resources and indicate how they get ahead of expanding surge 
events. One hundred percent of respondents answered both questions. . As the 
response data were analyzed, 14 themes emerged across responses for both 
Questions Three and Five. Themes were sorted by frequency with the most 
frequent response selected listed at the top of the table. Results are presented in 
Table 11: 
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Table 11.   Strategic Options When Faced with Limited Resources 
Strategies to Address Limited Resources Availability 
and Get Ahead of Surge Events 
Frequency of 
response 
Preplan, anticipation of probable events; activation of plans 12 
Prioritize actions toward immediate needs (deployment of 
limited resources, focus on achievable goals) 
12 
Call for additional resources early (more than needed) 9 
Expand ICS Structure, delegate responsibilities, empower 
personnel 
7 
Break the incident into manageable segments; adjust the 
length of operational periods 
4 
Construct options (multiple game plans) 3 
Constantly seek updated situational awareness 3 
Focus on macro view 3 
Integration of external agencies—nontraditional es 2 
Develop communications structure to match the incident 2 
Relationship based response of local chief officers – 
informal support 
1 
Confer with Colleagues 1 
Remain calm – influence on others 1 
Time checks from dispatch center 1 
Number of respondents = 20 
The variety of responses provides an overview of how command officers 
pursue strategies to manage the challenges associated with unfamiliar and often 
chaotic incidents. Each of these concepts is a tool that can be employed to deal 
with the unique aspects of the mitigation of surge events. This inventory provides 
command officers with several strategies to consider as they confront 
asymmetric events. Analysis of both of these questions found three key themes, 
which include preplanning or anticipating probable events, prioritizing the 
deployment of limited resources and calling for assistance early.  
Preplanning was identified as the primary factor to mitigate limited 
resource availability. Plans were viewed as providing a degree of guidance while 
the Incident Commander navigates the uncharted waters of a asymmetric 
response. Prioritizing resources and calling for assistance early in an event are 
common operating practices for the fire service, yet these concepts take on a 
higher level of importance as commanders are confronted with the intensity and 
magnitude of surge incidents. The three quotes below provide a variety of 
thoughts on this theme: 
 76 
Preplanning for surge events allows you to access additional 
resources in a coordinated and organized manner – this allows you 
to focus on the situation at hand. 
The key strategy is preplanning and having a plan in place for the 
event that occurs so infrequently. We often refer to it as the 3rd level 
of resources and having a plan in place and making sure that it is 
activated in a timely manner is critical to the eventual outcome of 
the incident. 
Try to anticipate what types of events can create potential problem 
for your community. In our case we have in excess of 60 train 
crossings a day. Should a derailment occur, we have the potential 
to have several hundred casualties. It is paramount to know where 
available resources are and where they are coming from. 
Prioritizing resources and calling for assistance early in an event are 
interrelated themes that are common operating practices for the fire service. 
These themes take a higher level of importance as commanders are confronted 
with the escalating resource needs of surge incidents. The three quotes below 
provide a variety of thoughts on these two themes: 
As a fire officer you must prioritize the response and commit those 
resources and personnel to portions of the incident that have been 
identified as the highest need. This situation can be very frustrating 
and in many situations, you have to strategize based on your 
known asset availability 
Request more resources than you think you will need. It’s always 
easier to have the resources responding early than to not have 
enough and experience delays due to response times. 
Front load resources for large/potentially complex events into the 
initial response. Call for additional resources at the first hint of the 
need for escalation based on the type of call, complexity of the 
incident, number of personnel needed to complete required tasks, 
duration of operational periods and the physical requirements of 
personnel. Be prudent but utilize the thought that it’s better to be 
looking at them than waiting for them. 
2. Regional Strategies to Complement the Initial Response 
Participants were asked what regional strategies have been developed in 
their area to complement the initial response. One hundred percent of 
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respondents answered this question. The respondents cited nine different 
regional strategies that they would employ. These strategies are outlined from 
highest to lowest frequency of response. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed 
in Table 12. 
Table 12.   Regional Strategies to Improve Response 
Regional Strategies to complement 
the initial response 
Frequency of 
response 
Regional / state mutual aid plans 22 
Call for additional resources early 5 
Relationship based response of local 
chief officers – informal support 
5 
Delegate responsibilities/ Assign ICS 
roles 
3 
County/area mutual aid center–Single 
point of contact 
2 
Integration of external agencies–
nontraditional roles 
2 
Activate Incident Management Team 
(IMT) 
1 
Activate state rehab and command 
and communications resources 
1 
Scenario based training 1 
Number of respondents = 20 
The activation of regional and state level mutual aid plans was selected 
four times as often as any other theme. The extensive use of mutual aid 
represents the plan most often employed during times of crisis. Survey 
participants concurred that experience demonstrated that as surge events 
expanded, insufficient resources are often a central challenge and look to the 
presence of well thought out and updated mutual-aid plans to be the foundation 
of developing a sufficient response.  
As incidents escalate, the IC is often overwhelmed with information and 
lacks the mental capacity and knowledge to organize a higher level of response 
that will produce resources from well beyond the commander’s normal operating 
area. In these time-sensitive, high-consequence situations, commanders may not 
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have the ability to organize necessary resource requests. As an example, a 
recent response to a mill fire that occurred on July 27, 2012 in Charlton, 
Massachusetts required the response of more than 25 communities during the 
first operational period of this event. Considering the magnitude of this situation, 
the IC rapidly activated second and third tier response plans, which activated the 
response of this high concentration of resources. Activation of these second and 
third tier plans automated response of resources and provided an organized 
solution to the challenge of matching resource volume to the scope of the event. 
The two quotations below demonstrate the importance of these plans: 
Regional strategies as far as resources have been worked into our 
response plan. 
My metro region has a fantastic mutual aid and automatic aid 
response plan that is often utilized. A lot of planning has taken 
place to cover any event with manpower and equipment as quickly 
as possible with a single call for assistance. 
Another theme of note is the relationship-based response of local CFOs. 
Respondents indicated that the response of CFOs from the local area often form 
the backbone of the first available level of support. The two quotations below 
indicate that in many jurisdictions this informal and often relationship-based 
response has become a normal operating expectation. 
The automatic response of Chief Officers for command and control 
of resources from multiple jurisdictions, assistance with scene 
management, and safety are critical. 
Mutual aid relationships include the response of Chief Officers to 
assist with incident management functions. 
E. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
1. Strategies to Avoid Becoming Overwhelmed by Incident 
Related Information 
Participants were asked to reflect on how they manage the overwhelming 
level of information that is often directed at the IC during the response to 
significant events. One hundred percent of respondents answered this question. 
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The respondents cited eleven different strategies that they would employ. These 
strategies are outlined from highest to lowest frequency of response. A 
breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 13: 
Table 13.   Strategies to Manage and Filter Information Flow 




Expand ICS Structure, delegate 
responsibilities, empower personnel 
9 
Utilize an aide, liaison, scribe, 
communications specialist 
8 
Write down plans, checklists 5 
Break incident into manageable 
segments 
3 
Relationship based response of local 
chief officers–informal support 
3 
Security, isolation of command post 1 
Conduct regular internal briefing 
session 
1 
Ensure competence of key personnel  1 
Radio communications discipline 1 
Confirm credibility of information 1 
Assign public information officer–
conduct press briefings away from 
the command post 
1 
                  Number of respondents = 20 
   
The previous survey round identified that the IC can often be overloaded 
by incident related information. Although some of this information is valuable, 
much of the information directed toward the IC is irrelevant or unverified. Three 
primary strategies emerged to sort, filter and manage information during 
emergency operations emerged. These themes include expanding the ICS 
structure, utilizing and aide or liaison, and documentation through job aids. The 




If you utilize an expanding system that builds out positions within 
the ICS system and have competent people filling those key 
positions, you will give yourself the greatest opportunity of success. 
Build out the ICS structure to delegate different areas of 
responsibility to others. 
Having an Operations Officer directly at the heart of the situation is 
critical. In addition, calling in additional resources sooner than later 
allows for more positions within the ICS sphere to be filled thus 
reducing the information overload and allowing the IC to establish a 
tactical plan. 
I try to expand the incident command structure to the level 
necessary to maintain a span of control of five. This is sometimes 
very difficult during the initial phase of an incident. Having close 
working relationships with area chiefs allows for a more rapid 
expansion of the command structure. 
The utilization of a liaison or aide presented as a very popular strategy. 
Assigning a second person to work with the Incident Commander reflects 
principles that are automated in other incident management structures. As an 
example, the German IMS system automates the response of a three-person 
incident management support team to both routine and nonroutine incidents. The 
presence of an aide or liaison serves as a safety net that extends the capability 
of the IC. The two quotations listed below demonstrate the value of this concept: 
I am fortunate to have an aide; his help in the command post is 
immeasurable and provides a synergistic relationship. Although he 
is not a command officer, our open lines of communication allow 
him to be a second set of eyes and ears in the CP. He shadows my 
tactical worksheet as a safety net that enables us to track (and not 
lose) all resources. Additionally, he monitors and operates other 
radio channels so that I can focus on the tactical channel assigned 
to the incident. I don’t have to move my attention from the scene to 
communications to provide update or call for assistance. 
I assign a liaison to assist me with the filtering of information and 
keep the face-to-face contact to a minimum while I am developing a 
strategy..  
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F. RANKING THE IMPORTANCE OF SIGNALS INDICATING AN 
EMERGENT EVENT  
Questions Seven and Eight asked respondents to reflect on the 18 themes 
that an emergency is moving beyond the expected and becoming unpredictable, 
unfamiliar or chaotic. One respondent skipped both questions. The two questions 
are listed below: 
7. As a reminder, during the first survey you were asked to 
identify signals that an event is becoming unpredictable, 
unfamiliar or chaotic. Analysis of the responses to round one 
identified 18 themes by consolidating similar responses. As an 
example, responses including stress on the Incident 
Commander, anxiety, confusion, and dry mouth were 
consolidated into the theme of overwhelmed. 
 
The following listing summarizes the response from the group 
of participants and identifies 18 themes, which are listed from 
highest to lowest in terms of response frequency. Please rate 
each of the items below in terms of how important the signal 
would be to you in terms of indicating a situation is becoming 
unpredictable or chaotic. [Rating scale 1 = not important to 6 = 
extremely important]  
8. From the list above, please utilize your experience to pick the 
five signals that you feel are most important.  
Question Seven asked participants rate the relative importance of each 
signal on a six-point Likert Scale that used responses ranging from not important 
(1) to extremely important (6). Question Eight asked respondents to select the 
top five signals that they felt were the most important. The themes developed 
during the analysis of Round One were utilized as a basis for these two 
questions.  
Analysis of these data resulted in the formation of two tables. The first 
table ranks the 18 signals using the mean score as basis for evaluation. Based 
on an evaluation of the data, the top nine signals were considered to be very 
important, while the bottom nine signals were identified by the respondents as 
somewhat important since all but one are greater than three and one half 
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(midpoint of the scale). As all of the top five signals identified by Question Eight 
are found within the group of very important signals, a high level of consistency is 
noted between the two questions. None of the 18 themes listed were considered 
to be unimportant. Data presented has been sorted to show the most frequent 
themes at the top of each table. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed Table 
14. 
Table 14.   Importance of Signs of Incident Transformation 
Signs of Incident Transformation Mean 
Score 




Lack of progress (situation escalates, unable to 
complete assignments) 
5.4 
Strained command structure (lack of structure, 
unable to manage roles) 
5.2 
Communications strain/breakdown (interoperability, 
radio system overload) 
5.2 
Lack of sufficient information (situational analysis) 5.1 
High risk decisions (risk based analysis) 5.0 
Insufficient resources (loss of span of control) 4.8 
Lack of teamwork (freelancing) 4.8 
Overwhelmed (anxiety or confusion) 4.8 
Unfamiliar / unexpected occurrences (odd requests, 
lack of similar experience, reporting volume not 
matching) 
4.6 
Managed by the incident (reactive nature emerges) 4.5 
Command inundated with information (external 
concerns, requests for information) 
4.4 
Multiple decision points/priorities (multiple 
operational sites/incidents) 
4.4 
Loss of responder composure (paralysis, frustration, 
errors) 
4.3 
Complex operations/structure (need to collaborate) 4.2 
Need to redeploy resources (defensive posture) 3.9 
Sense of urgency (intuition, voice modulation) 3.8 
Time expectations exceeded 3.4 
           Number of Respondents = 19 
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The compromise of safe operations has been a theme that has 
reverberated through both survey rounds. This indicates the importance of safety 
as a foundation that facilitates forward progress in the mitigation of emergency 
incidents. Strained command structure, communication compromise, and the 
lack of situation awareness have all been a reoccurring focus of respondents. 
Question Eight asked respondents to rank the five most important signals 
of incident transformation. The theme of safety compromise was selected as the 
top signal with the concurrence of nine respondents. (47.4 percent). A wide 
distribution of responses was noted in the remaining four prioritized rankings, 
indicating a wide variety of opinion relative to the importance of these signals. 
Each of the 18 signals was selected by at least one respondent as being among 
the top five signals. Analysis of this data indicates a concurrence that the top 
nine signals identified in Table 14 have a high level of importance. A breakdown 
of this analysis is detailed Table 15: 
Table 15.   Ranking the Top Five Signals of Incident Transformation 
Ranking the Top Five Signals Ranking Percenta
ge score 
Safety compromise (loss of accountability, 
mayday, victim/firefighter injury) 
1  
47.4%  (9) 
Lack of sufficient information (situational 
analysis) 
2 21.1%  (4) 
Strained command structure (lack of 
structure, unable to manage roles) 
3 21.1%  (4) 
Lack of progress (situation escalates, unable 
to complete assignments) 
4 15.8%  (3) 
Insufficient resources (loss of span of control) 5 15.8%  (3) 
        Number of respondents = 19 
 The consistency presented between the responses to these separate 
questions indicates there is a high degree of concurrence relative to the top 
signals that commanders should consider as they face surge events. This 
question further defines the inventory of signals created by the Delphi panel in 
Round One. 
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G. DECISION AIDS 
1. Decision Aid and Tool to Build Confidence and Capacity 
Table 16.   Somewhat Important Themes Identifying Signs of Incident 
Transformation




Video based aerial reconnaissance (drone, helicopter) 4 
Sensor based computerized accountability 4 
Automatic Incident Management Team (IMT) response 4 
Training programs and exercises 3 
Video conferencing capability with experienced 
personnel or subject matter experts 
2 
Sensor based interior monitoring of temperature, 
thermal imagery 
2 
Computerized checklists and preplan data 2 
Internet access on the incident scene 1 
Relationship based response of local chief officers – 
informal support 
1 
Number of respondents = 19 
 
Participants were asked to identify decision aids and tools that would 
improve the IC’s confidence and expand response capabilities. Nineteen (95 
percent) percent of survey participants answered the question. One respondent 
skipped this question. The respondents cited nine different concepts that they 
would employ. Sixty-six percent of the response involves the expanded use of 
technology, while the other 34 percent focus on organizational policy, training 
and relationship based support. These ideas are outlined from highest to lowest 
frequency of response. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 16. 
Responses to this question demonstrate that ICs seek to enhance the 
level of information they can access. Specifically the use of aerial 
reconnaissance offers a macro perspective of evolving conditions that is often 
elusive on the incident scene. Using sensors embedded with crews operating in 
remote areas provides a micro perspective of the conditions and serves as a 
mechanism to evaluate conditions in an area of operation and a means to 
enhance the safety of operating personnel. The third notable theme refers to the 
expansion of the ICS system and automated response of resources, such as the 
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response of area CFOs. A variety of quotes that demonstrate the need for 
increased reliable incident based information is contained below: 
Resources such as aerial recon can be extremely effective. The 
Tampa Florida Police Department puts a helicopter in the air that 
streams live video and provides other information based resources 
to the IC on any second alarm or greater fire. 
Increased and more accurate information from within and around 
the incident. Better audio, video or data relative to the incident can 
help an experienced command staff to make informed decisions. 
I personally respond best to visual cues, so it is important for me to 
have visual inputs when making decisions. 
We need to have better real time incident mapping to give the IC a 
virtual birds eye view on a large screen such as the window panels 
displays that are in some hotel lobbies. 
H. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EVALUATION 
1. NIMS as an Optimal Model 
Participants were asked to indicate if NIMS is an optimal model for making 
decisions during unpredictable and unfamiliar events. Nineteen (95 percent) 
survey participants answered the question. One respondent skipped this 
question. Fifty-seven point nine percent of respondents indicated that NIMS was 
the optimal incident management system model, while 42.1 percent indicated 
that it was not the optimal model. Respondents were afforded the opportunity to 
comment on the reasons behind their respective answer. All nineteen 
respondents (100 percent) provided a narrative to substantiate their response. 
Analysis of the response to the qualitative portion of this question focused on the 
identification of common themes. These themes are outlined from highest to 





Table 17.   Comments that NIMS is the Optimal IMS Model  
 






Standard tool–proper framework 4 
Scalable and provides structure 3 
Helps break incident into manageable 
segments 
1 
Ensures both control and information flow 1 
Other systems are not more effective 1 
 
Table 18.   Comments that NIMS is Not the Optimal IMS Model 
 






Not a flexible system 3 
Use instinct in unfamiliar situations 2 
Not applicable in smaller communities 2 
Not optimal in rapidly expanding incidents 1 
Things need to be tweaked for each 
department/situation 
1 
  Number of respondents = 19 
Responses indicate that there is wide disagreement relative to NIMS 
being the optimal model for and IMS System. The following include a variety of 
comments that illustrate both sides of this debate: 
2. Responses Supporting NIMS ICS as the Optimal Model 
NIMS ICS gives us a proper framework to handle all situations big 
and small. 
If properly expanded NIMS ICS should be able to support any 
event. 
The use of ICS at every event is important. The use of this system 
at larger and unpredictable events is needed in order to have 
proper control and a good flow of information. 
 87 
NIMS addresses key factors of organizational and human 
limitations. Other models may be imaginative, but are not likely to 
be truly more effective. 
3. Responses Suggesting That NIMS ICS is not the Optimal 
Model 
NIMS is a great foundational guide but I don’t think it can be used in 
some situations that become too big too quickly. 
While I do believe in NIMS as a model, and would have answered 
that it was the optimal framework, I chose that NIMS was not the 
optimal model because I feel we are often expected to blindly follow 
the system without regard to the individual circumstances. 
I think NIMS is a fantastic resource when you have the staff 
necessary to implement the system. 
In smaller communities, it may not be possible for resources to 
assemble quick enough for command to establish an appropriate 
structure to mitigate the chaotic situation. 
4. Improvisation to Adapt NIMS 
Participants were asked to identify strategies that they have utilized to 
make ICS more effective, as they have faced the challenges of responding to 
surge incidents. Nineteen (95 percent) of the survey participants answered the 
question. One respondent skipped this question. Fifty-two percent of the 
respondents indicated that they have improvised or adapted ICS to be more 
effective and 47.4 percent indicated that they have not altered the structure of 
ICS. In addition to answering the quantitative question, seven respondents 
provided a narrative detailing how they have improvised NIMS. A table was 
constructed to capture pertinent themes that substantiate their respective open-
ended responses. The respondents cited three different concepts that they have 
utilized to adapt ICS. These themes are outlined from highest to lowest 




Table 19.   Observations Improvising and Adapting ICS 




Assign personnel to multiple 
command roles 
4 
Deferred assuming command as the 
first unit arrives 
2 
Setup nontraditional groups (natural 
resources, environmental) 
1 
         Number of respondents = 7 
Two significant concepts for altering NIMS were presented by the seven 
survey respondents that provided a narrative relative to how they have altered 
NIMS. First, consistent with the themes of both insufficient resources and an 
initial lack of command staff, assigning personnel to multiple roles was the most 
popular adaptive strategy. Second, deferring the assumption of command was 
also presented as a tactical option when a lack of resources exist on the incident 
scene. Typically, command is assumed upon the arrival of the first emergency 
response unit. The concept of deferring the assumption of command means that  
first arriving responders would concentrate on incident control tactics. Command 
would be formally assumed at a later time concurrent with the arrival of 
secondary responding units. Although this concept is contrary to the principles of 
NIMS that emphasis the value of initiating strategic actions as soon as personnel 
arrive on the incident scene, this strategy was consistent with an adaptive 
measure to overcome the initial lack of resources that threads through much of 
this thesis. Two quotations below indicate the strategy to assign personnel to 
multiple command roles or positions during the initial phase of surge events. 
I have had people assume multiple command roles when there 
should have been one person assigned to each role. 
A MCI may require a Medical Officer and an Operations Officer 
I. CONCLUSION 
Building on the foundation of knowledge accumulated in Round One, 
several consistent themes are beginning to emerge. The goal of Round Two was 
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to validate and prioritize the results from Round One pertaining to the rating of 
signals that indicate an incident is becoming emergent and to develop useful 
information pertaining to both the coordination of response and information 
management strategies. A high level of agreement was demonstrated as the 18 
themes identified in Round One were classified by respondent’s opinion of 
importance in one question and then ranked to identify the top five themes. This 
classification can serve to inform Incident Commanders and provide perspective 
on the importance of these signals. The top five signals identified by the Delphi 
panel are listed below: 
• Safety compromise (loss of accountability, mayday, 
victim/firefighter injury) 
• Lack of sufficient information (situational analysis) 
• Strained command structure (lack of structure, unable to manage 
roles) 
• Lack of progress (situation escalates, unable to complete 
assignments) 
• Insufficient resources (loss of span of control) 
Permeating the entire survey round, responses emerged suggesting that 
the mitigation and coordination demands of surge incidents often exceed the 
initial command and control capacity of the responders. Several responses note 
that resources beyond those thought to be needed should be immediately 
requested in an effort to match resources to the scope of the event. During the 
initial operational period, ICs often lack a sufficient number of qualified personnel 
to fill command roles and expand the ICS system. The most common solution to 
this shortfall is the informal and often relationship-based response of CFOs from 
the immediate area. Although the use of more formalized resources was also 
discussed, this informal, networked response offers the most rapid infusion of 
expertise that can form a cohesive command team. 
Resource acquisition during surge incidents is often accomplished through 
preplanning for a specific event or through more generalized response plans that 
are designed for a wide variety of surge incidents. Several respondents 
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commented on the need to utilize second  (regional) and third (state) tier mutual 
aid plans as a prerequisite to success. These plans provide a level of 
organization that would not be possible for an IC to develop in the heat of battle. 
This chapter provides the IC with a series of ideas that can enhance the 
ability to cope with surge events. Respondents provided and ranked a variety of 
strategic ideas that have produced successful results as experienced ICs have 
faced the demands of surge events. Although some of these concepts are 
familiar to the majority of respondents, a number of these coping strategies, such 
as the idea to assign a communications specialist known as Communications 
Leader (COML), were not well known. The importance of this chapter is that it 
provides a toolbox of strategic options. This thesis has provided the opportunity 
for 32 experienced fire officers to build consensus and share new ideas, best 
practices, and innovations. Hintze claims that the concept of experts and novices 
identifies the need for mentoring as a tool that can help the novice build 
proficiency.123  Although many blogs and Internet resources exist, the American 
Fire Service lacks an effective way to routinely share the experience of others. 
Addressing this need could extend the value of this thesis. 
The results accrued through the analysis of Round Two were utilized to 
inform Round Three Questions. Round Three Questions focus on the 
identification of concepts that contribute to value and/or the effectiveness of 
operations, determining the frequency that various command strategies are 
utilized, and gauging the receptivity to implementation of IMS components from 
other models. This progressive approach to the development of this research 
process will identify the most promising strategic options based on the emerging 
consensus of the Delphi panel. 
                                            
123 Hintze, First Responder Problem Solving, 89. 
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VI. METHODS AND RESULTS—DELPHI ROUND THREE 
SURVEY 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS AND SELECTION CRITERIA 
The survey was sent to the same panel of 32 experts that agreed to 
participate in the Round One Delphi Survey. The respondents were once again 
polled using Survey Monkey, an online survey tool.  On July 28, 2012, the link to 
the Third Round Survey was sent to participants who were asked to complete the 
survey within two weeks. The response rate was initially moderate, a reminder 
email was sent during the final week of the survey period. The survey was closed 
on August 5, 2012, two weeks after being distributed. Twenty-one of the thirty-
two potential participants (66 percent) responded. 
B. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND THREE:  INSTRUMENTATION 
During this research project, questions for Round Three of the Delphi 
survey were formulated based on the themes identified within the literature 
review as presented in Chapter II, and the results of the previous two survey 
rounds detailed within Chapters IV and V. As the survey was drafted, it was 
piloted tested with several experienced Chief Fire Officers from outside of the 
sample to clarify the intent and wording of the questions in the survey. The pilot 
process resulted in light editing of the questions in the survey.  
The third round consisted of quantitative and qualitative questions that 
addressed the three broad categories: (1) Concepts that contribute to value 
and/or the effectiveness of operations, (2) Frequency that identified command 
methods and strategies utilized, (3) Receptivity to implementation of IMS 
components from other models.  
The questions asked in Round Three can be found in Appendix C. One 
example of one rating and one open-ended question are contained in Table 18. 
The first two questions were administrative. The remainder of the survey 
consisted of three quantitative and five qualitative questions.  
 92 
Question Three was an open-ended query on ideas to make mutual-aid 
more effective. Questions Four and Six were quantitative questions that asked 
participants to rate the frequency of use of 18 methodologies to assist in the 
management of surge events identified in Round Two respondents were also 
asked to indicate the likelihood of future adoption, if they had never used these 
methods previously. Question Five was an open ended query that asked 
participants to identify how the response of additional CFOs from the area could 
be strengthened. Question Six was an open-ended query that asked respondents 
to identify methods to filter the overwhelming amount of information that is often 
directed at the IC. Question Seven was a quantitative question that asked 
participants to classify the priority for investment in the development of decision 
aids identified in Round Two. Question Eight was an open-ended query that 
asked participants to provide other ideas relative to the development of decision 
aids that are useful during the response to surge events. Chapter III provides a 
compares NIMS to the German IMS system known as DV 100. This comparative 
analysis identified several differences in these two IMS systems that informed the 
development of Question Nine. This quantitative question queried respondents 
about their willingness to adopt methodologies identified through the review of 
the German IMS (DV 100). The final question was an open-ended query that 
asked respondents to provide any creative or innovative ideas that would 










Table 20.   Delphi Survey Round Three Sample Questions 
 
Quantitative and Qualitative Question Examples from the 




9. During the second round Delphi survey, 
approximately 45 percent of respondents indicated 
that the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) is not an optimal model for making decisions 
during unpredictable and unfamiliar events. A 
review of the German Regulation DV 100 (the 
German equivalent to NIMS) identified several 
potential concepts. Would you support modifying 
NIMS with these practices? 
Ten practices were listed in this question and 
respondents were asked indicate if they would 
support modifying NIMS with these practices by 





5. Other than the use of mutual aid plans, the 
second round Delphi survey suggested that one of 
the next most important capabilities is the informal 
response of area Chief Officers. The following 
quotes are taken from round two survey responses. 
 
“The automatic response of area Chief Officers 
provide assistance with scene management, safety, 
and the control of resources from multiple 
jurisdictions.” 
 
“Mutual aid relationships include the response of 
Chief Officers to assist with incident management 
functions. This can be informal, with chiefs 
responding with their companies as part of the 
mutual aid response.” 
 
How could the value of the informal response of 
area Chief Officers detailed above be strengthened? 
 
 
Following the principles of the Delphi method, the results were analyzed, 
coded and mapped. The results of Round Three are presented and discussed 
below. 
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C. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND THREE:  RESULTS 
This section presents each question from Round Three, and the results 
obtained. The Round Three Survey was focused on four broad categories:  (1) 
identifying the frequency of use of incident command strategies identified in the 
previous two survey rounds, (2) Determining the priority for funding of concepts 
that would enhance decision making and (3) considering the potential of adoption 
of IMS principles from other models and (4) developing an inventory of other 
creative and innovative ideas to enhance decision making and cope with 
unfamiliar situations. Qualitative responses were analyzed to identify themes and 
then all responses were categorized according to those themes.  
D. EFFECTIVENESS OF MUTUAL AID 
1. Improving the Second and Third Tier of Mutual Aid Response 
Participants were asked to reflect on what could make the existing second  
(regional) and third (state) tier mutual aid plans more effective. One hundred 
percent of respondents answered this question. The narrative responses were 
analyzed and eleven themes emerged. These ideas are outlined from highest to 
lowest frequency of response. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 
21: 
Table 21.   Ideas to Improve Second and Third Tier Mutual Aid Response 
Ideas to Improve the Effectiveness 




Increase training opportunities 10 
Increase the number of simulations 
conducted 
9 
Build awareness of mutual aid plans 4 
Review and update mutual aid plans 3 







Ideas to Improve the Effectiveness 




Automate response 2 
Preplan communications 2 
Develop a enhanced regional focus 2 
Eliminate competing plans 1 
Provide statewide situation and 
resource status reporting 
1 
Develop a resource inventory system 1 
       Number of respondents = 21 
 
Respondents indicated broad agreement pertaining to the use of and need 
for second and third tier mutual aid plans. A number of comments indicated 
concern over the infrequent use of these plans and the lack of training and 
updates. To improve the effectiveness of these plans, respondents indicated 
there should be more training and exercises, marketing efforts to build 
awareness and increase use, and periodic review and update of these plans. 
Two quotations illustrating the need for training and exercises are listed below:  
I find that these plans, while great on paper, are not utilized often 
and therefore we are not afforded the opportunity to find the flaws. 
We need to either train in the use of the plans more often or ease 
the rules associated with the third tier of mutual aid. 
One of the major problems with the infrequency of the major event 
is that we do not practice very often for them. 
Four respondents indicated there was a need to build awareness of the 
plans within a broader fire service audience. One narrative mentioned that there 
should be a more intensive effort to create buy-in through a more participative 
development process. Another indicated that awareness of the operational 
aspects of the second  and third tier response plans need to extend beyond the 
rank of CFO. The two quotes listed below focus on this the need for expanding 
awareness: 
Effectiveness of mutual aid plans is defined by awareness of the 
plan and familiarity with the plan. 
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There needs to be training at the community level about the 
resources that are available and the way the system works. 
E. COMMAND STRATEGIES 
1. Frequency of Use and Potential Adoption of Strategies Utilized 
During Routine Command Operations 
Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency they use various 
strategies that were identified by concepts within the literature review and 
information provided through the first two Delphi survey rounds to enhance 
command capacity. If respondents selected they never use the specific strategic 
option listed, they were asked if they would consider future adoption of this 
concept. One hundred percent of respondents answered this question. The 
column shaded in grey captures the percent of respondents that indicated they 
had never utilized the strategy listed, but they would consider adoption of this 
idea in the future. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 22: 
Table 22.   Frequency of Use and the Potential of Adoption of Strategies to 


















Assign a Liaison 
Officer 
19% 33% 19% 29% 19% 
Assign a Safety Officer  5% 9% 86% 5% 
Develop a Unified 
Command Structure 
 5% 38% 57%  
Utilize Command Staff 
or Additional Chief 
Officers from the Local 
Area 
5%  30% 65% 5% 
Appoint a Deputy 
Incident Commander 
33% 33% 9% 19% 24% 
Appoint a Deputy 
Operations Officer 
33% 19% 24% 19% 29% 
Assign personnel to 
the Logistics Section 
16% 26% 26% 32% 16% 
Assign personnel to 28% 24% 24% 24% 14% 
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the Planning section 
Assign personnel to 
the Finance Section 




resources than the 
initial assessment 
indicates 
 29% 42% 29%  
Break the incident into 
manageable segments 




 5% 9% 86%  
Confer with 
experienced colleagues 
that are not on the 
incident scene 
19% 24% 38% 19% 14% 
Construct options 
(multiple game plans) 
 
5% 29% 47% 19%  
Integrate 
nongovernmental 
personnel (e.g., local 
experts, private sector 
resources 
5% 45% 30% 20%  
Adjust the length of 
operational periods 
14% 33% 39% 14% 5% 
Automate notification 
of elapsed time 
through your dispatch 
center 
29% 19% 14% 38% 24% 
    Number of respondents = 21 
 
It is interesting to note that all 17 ideas enjoy a wide range of use. 
Concepts that were the most frequently utilized include the following:  
• Assignment of a Safety Officer;  
• Constantly seeking updated situational awareness;  
• Utilizing command staff or additional CFOs from the local area;  
• Development of a unified command structure;  
• Break the incident into manageable pieces.  
 
 98 
Respondents that answered “never” were asked if they would consider 
adoption in the aftermath of this survey process. Ideas that respondents 
indicated they would most frequently consider for future adoption include the 
following:  
• Assignment of a Deputy Operations Officer;  
• Assigning a Deputy Incident Commander;  
• Automation of elapsed time notification; 
• Assignment of a Liaison Officer.  
Many of the respondents indicated that they would consider adopting one 
or more of these concepts. Providing commanders with new concepts and ideas 
is one of the main goals of this thesis. 
2. Strengthening the Value of Informal Response 
Responses during the first two rounds of the Delphi survey process 
indicated that the informal response of local chief officers was a valuable tool in 
managing surge incidents. Participants were asked to reflect on how the value of 
the informal response of area chief officers could be strengthened. One hundred 
percent of respondents answered this question. The responses were analyzed 
and eleven themes were identified. These ideas are outlined from highest to 
lowest frequency of responses in Table 23: 
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Table 23.   Ideas to Enhance the Value of the Informal Response of CFOs 
Ideas to Enhance the Value of 
Informal CFO Response 
Frequency of 
response 
Formalize response plan 8 
Provide regional planning and training 7 
Automate response 5 
Require participants to opt in 2 
Provide role specific training 2 
Provide access to experts 2 
Create a field operations guide (FOG) 2 
Expand personal relationship 1 
Identify roles and expectations 1 
More experience to build skill 1 
Create written backup documentation 1 
 Number of respondents = 21 
 
Based on the responses to the previous questions, obtaining informal 
support from local CFOs is a strategy employed by the vast majority of 
participants. Consistent with previous questions, the need to formalize this 
support mechanism through regional planning, and an expanded scope of 
training remains an open opportunity. This informal support methodology is 
typically developed through personal relationships and networking. The highest 
response indicated that support network generated by the response of local 
CFOs should be both formalized and automated. The following three quotations 
relate to the need to formalize incident support response: 
Formalize plans and activations, create position specific personnel 
with alternate team members to provide consistent response. 
Move to a more structured IMT approach. 
Make this a formal specific level of response that has multiple 





Another theme is the need to automate the activation of the system and 
response of Chief Officers within the immediate area. Although automation is 
linked to formalization, it involves separate actions, these distinct comments were 
captured within several narratives. 
To strengthen their response it needs to be added to running cards 
that would automatically activate response. 
Command staff should be considered as part of the complement of 
additional resources that are added to a response. 
3. Frequency of Use and Potential Adoption of Command 
Methodologies During the Response to Surge Events 
Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency they use various 
command methodologies during the response to surge events. These 
methodologies were identified by concepts within the literature review and 
information provided through the first two Delphi survey rounds. If respondents 
selected they never use the specific strategic option listed, they were asked if 
they would consider future adoption of this concept. The column shaded in grey 
captures the percent of respondents that indicated they had never utilized the 
strategy listed, but they would consider adoption of this idea in the future. One 
hundred percent of respondents answered this question. A breakdown of this 
analysis is detailed in Table 24. 
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Table 24.   Identification Frequency of Use and the Potential of Adoption 
























 10% 10% 80%  
Utilize an aide 5% 14% 38% 43%  
Assign a liaison  44% 25% 31%  





24% 33% 14% 29% 5% 
Write down plans, 
complete 
checklists 









of local chief 
officers – 
informal support 
10% 10% 33% 47% 5% 
Implement 
























































away from the 
incident scene 




 14% 43% 43%  
Limit radio traffic 
to critical 
communications 




10% 14% 38% 38% 10% 
Assign a Public 
Information 
officer (PIO) 





10% 10% 37% 43% 5% 
 Number of respondents = 21 
 
It is interesting to note that all 15 concepts presented enjoy a wide range 
of use. Ideas that respondents indicated they would most frequently consider for 
future adoption include the following:  
• Expand ICS structure, delegate responsibilities, 
• Encourage the relationship-based response of local chief officers – 
informal support 
• Conduct press briefings away from the command post 
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• Conduct regular internal briefing sessions  
Respondents that answered never were asked if they would consider 
adoption in the aftermath of this survey process. Many of the respondents 
indicated they would consider adopting one or more of these concepts. Ideas that 
respondents indicated they would most frequently consider for future adoption 
include the following: 
• Implement security at the command post 
• Assign a scribe 
• Verify the credibility of information 
F. CONCEPTS TO ENHANCE DECISION MAKING 
1. Ranking the Priority of Investment in Decision Aids 
Responses during Round Two of the Delphi survey process identified 
several ideas for the development of decision aids that would assist commanders 
with decision making. Participants were asked to rank the priority of investment in 
the eight concepts listed in the three tables below. One hundred percent of 
respondents answered this question. These ideas were outlined from highest to 
lowest based on frequency. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Tables 
25–27: 
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Table 25.   Top Priority Investments 
Top Priority Items Average rating Percentage 




was a top 
priority  
1. Training programs and 
exercises 
2.7 76% (16) 
2. Automatic Incident 
Management Team (IMT) 
response 
2.6 62% (13) 
3. Computerized check lists and 
preplan data 
2.5 62% (13) 
4. Enhanced accountability 
systems that indicate 
personnel position and 
elevation using sensors 
2.5 65.% (13) 
 
Table 26.   Medium Priority Investments 
Medium Priority Items Average rating  Percentage 




was a medium 
priority  
1. Internet access on the incident 
scene 
2.2 50% (10) 
2. Sensor based interior 
monitoring of temperature and 
thermal imagery  
2.0 55% (11) 
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Table 27.   Low Priority Investments 
Low Priority Items Average rating Percentage 




was a low 
priority  
1. Video conferencing capability 
with experienced personnel or 
subject matter experts 
1.7 45% (9) 
2. Video based aerial 
reconnaissance 
1.4 70% (14) 
 Number of respondents = 21 
 
The information in the tables is further distilled to provide an overall view 
of this quantitative rating process. This information is detailed in Figure 7: 
 
Figure 7.   Decision Aid Investment Rating Chart (Produced by the author based 
on Round Three responses) 
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The second round of the Delphi process asked participants to identify 
potential decision aids that would enhance decision making. In Round Three, this 
list was then imported into a rating scale in which respondents had to choose the 
investment priority. A comparison between this question and the Round Two 
question on the identification of decision aids found a disparity in that items 
shifted dramatically when the focus of the question shifted from value associated 
with the concept to investment priority. As an example, video based aerial 
reconnaissance was viewed as the most valuable decision aid to inform 
situational awareness. However, this became a low priority when the question 
was reframed to consider investment. Some of this change in response might be 
associated with the fact that development of unfamiliar technologies could be 
perceived as cost prohibitive. As a second example, development of training 
programs and exercises was a mid-level priority in terms of value in Round Two, 
yet when the framework of investment was imposed, training and exercises 
became the top investment priority. Some of this change might be associated 
with respondent familiarity with training and exercise programs, as well as the 
benefit of being able to easily identify the actual cost of this methodology. 
2. Ideas on Decision Aids 
Although the Round Two survey asked respondents to identify decision 
aids, this segment of the Round Three survey provided an additional opportunity 
to further expand responses at the close of this survey process. Nine (43 
percent) participants answered this question and twelve (57 percent) skipped this 
question. Four themes were identified that focused on different ideas that have 
the potential to strengthen response efforts. These ideas are outlined from 
highest to lowest frequency of response. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed 




Table 28.   Ideas for Decision Aids 
Ideas for Decision Aids Frequency of 
response 
Development of field operations 
guides (FOG) and backup 
documentation 
4 
Access to experts 2 




 Number of respondents = 9 
 
Although the need for training and exercises remains a constant theme, 
the development of a quick reference document that summarizes operational 
policies was the most frequent response. This type of document is known as a 
Field Operations Guide (FOG). Several comments noted the propensity for 
technology to fail when it is needed most and the development of a FOG was 
viewed as instructive backup in the event of technological failure. Another theme 
is the respondent’s desire to involve experts in the decision-making process. This 
represents an open and inclusive attitude to incorporate nontraditional personnel 
into the command team. Three pertinent comments associated with these two 
themes are listed below: 
Pocket guides are also helpful. During a prolonged incident you 
don’t need to worry about running out of battery power on a 
handheld device if you have the information in a printed pocket 
guide as a backup! 
There is a concern for high tech not working because of infrequent 
use. 
Access to experts. If I am dealing with a flood situation, I want to 
speak with a dam engineer. 
G. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: GERMAN VERSES U.S. IMS 
1. Potential Adoption of German IMS Principles 
During the development of this thesis, a comparative analysis was done 
comparing NIMS and the German IMS system known as DV 100.  This analysis 
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is further presented within Chapter III. The comparative findings informed the 
development of this area of research. Based on this analysis, several aspects of 
DV 100 were evaluated on the potential for these concepts to be imported into 
NIMS. Ten ideas, which are discussed in Chapter III, were presented for 
participants to indicate if they would support modifying NIMS with the concepts 
listed in Table 29. One hundred percent of respondents answered this question. 
These ideas are outlined from highest to lowest frequency of affirmative 
response. Analysis of these data indicates that the vast majority of respondents 
are open to considering ideas that may improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of NIMS. A breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 29. 
Table 29.   Adoption of Comparative Concepts  






Development of situational analysis teams (dedicated 
personnel that focus on gathering an verifying 
information for the Incident Commander) 
100%  
Development of regional support teams 100%  
Develop a communications and transmission staff 
function 
95% 5% 
Develop and information gathering and assessment staff 
function 
95% 5% 
Automate response of incident support teams 86% 14% 
Develop a personnel an administration staff function 85% 15% 
Develop computer based command checklists 81% 19% 
Develop Partnerships with nontraditional organizations 
such as private corporations or clubs 
76% 24% 
Move the command post to a fixed off site facility 38% 62% 
Provide less structure and allow more creativity 20% 80% 
 Number of respondents = 21 
A review of the data presented in the question indicates that respondents 
are open to the adoption of eight out of the ten concepts listed. This indicates the 
majority of respondents are open to the introduction of new ideas, and they 
believe that most of the concepts listed could enhance NIMS. Adoption of the 
concepts positively selected by the respondents would alter NIMS in the following 
ways: 
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• Place an enhanced focus on the importance of information to 
decision making during emergency response with designated 
analysis teams; 
• Automate the response of support teams; 
• Alter staff functions to create separate functions for 
communications and information assessment; 
• Create nontraditional partnerships with NGOs and other 
infrequently utilized agencies; 
• Increase the use of automated decision aids. 
Respondents indicated these concepts have the potential to enhance 
American ICS. The respondent’s willingness to adopt these concepts serves as 
an indicator that ICs have identified the need for change, innovation and 
improvisation when dealing with the response to surge incidents. Extreme events 
produce unforeseen problems and conditions requiring adaption, improvisation 
and creativity to deliver services under extreme conditions. In these rare cases, 
discipline that includes structure, doctrine and process must be balanced the 
creativity, improvisation and adaptability.124  In these novel situations, there is a 
tradeoff between the command and control necessary for mobilization and the 
need to ensure broad coordination and communication. 
If these concepts were adopted NIMS would be reshaped into a more 
agile system. A new focus would be placed on the value of information and the 
need for increased internal and external communications. The response of 
support teams would be automated and incorporate both local and regional 
personnel. Uniform decision aids would be deployed, along with the training 
necessary to properly use these tools. Command operations would become more 
open to the inclusion of nontraditional partners and NGOs. Disturbing the 
                                            
124 John R. Harrald, Jospeh Barbera, Irmak Renda-Tanali, Damon Coppola, and Gregory L. 
Shaw. Observing and Documenting the Inter-Organizational Response to the September 11th 
Attack on the Pentagon. Washington, DC: The George Washington University, Institute for Crisis, 
Disaster and Risk Management, 2002, 261. 
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command ecosystem through the implementation of these concepts would 
produce both benefits and concerns, which are listed below: 
2. Potential Benefits of Adoption 
• A consistent set of decision aids and tools would be provided to 
responders; 
• Training would become more intense and formalized; 
• The Depth of command resources would be increased; 
• The quality of information analysis would be improved; 
• Formalized support teams that regularly work together would be 
created; 
• Communications would become a specialty. 
3. Potential Concerns of Adoption 
• As many of these efforts would require regional response, some 
autonomy would be relinquished at the local level; 
• Training time and intensity would dramatically increase; 
• The cost of providing this level of training and the availability of 
response resources and decision aids would be significant. 
H. INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY 
1. Ideas to Enhance the Ability to Cope with Unfamiliar Situations 
Although the previous survey rounds asked respondents to identify their 
ideas for coping with unfamiliar events, this final segment of the Round Three 
survey provided an additional opportunity to reflect on the entire process and 
provide additional creative insight into concepts and ideas that could enhance 
decision making during the initial response to surge incidents. Sixteen (76 
percent) participants answered this question and five (24 percent) participants 
skipped this question. The respondents cited nine concepts that focused on 
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improving the Incident Commander’s ability to cope with unfamiliar situations. 
These ideas are outlined from highest to lowest frequency of response. A 
breakdown of this analysis is detailed in Table 30: 
Table 30.   Creative Ideas to Cope with Unfamiliar Events 




Training in nontraditional problem 
solving methods 
5 
Increased training and exercises 4 
Structured review of lessons learned 
from surge incidents 
4 
Create support teams 4 
Assign an aide to command positions 2 
Computerized job aides 1 
Bottom up ICS focus 1 
Build expanded relationships 1 
Create mobile dispatch operations to 
reduce radio traffic 
1 
 Number of respondents = 16 
 
Responses indicate a continuing focus on training. However, the training 
requested is nontraditional in that it has little to do with the fire services and is 
more about the development of new problem solving techniques. As an example, 
the application of business or military problem solving models could prove to add 
value and expand the methods available to responders. Respondents indicated 
that additional consideration should be given to the value of information garnered 
from those that have experienced the unique aspects of surge incidents. As an 
example, a class pertaining to ambulance mobilization that was delivered in July 
2012, by the author, utilized the radio traffic from the Century Theater Shooting in 
Aurora, Colorado as means to present the value of the experience gained by 
others who have experienced the unique nature of surge incidents. The 
development of additional support resources such as the creation of formalized 
support teams was another popular concept that indicates respondents believe  
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that the current level of support resources is insufficient when compared to the 
response needs produced by surge events. The following two quotes illustrate 
these points: 
Our problem solving techniques are based on our training and 
knowledge at surge events. I believe that we need to educate 
ourselves and learn to solve problems using nontraditional 
methods. 
We need to develop leadership skills through training but not just 
through fire service training. We need to include other fields and 
open our minds. 
I. CONCLUSION 
A review of the analysis of Round Three of the Delphi process indicates 
that increased emphasis needs to be placed on the dominant themes of: 
increased training, building awareness, and exercising strategic plans. It is these 
second and third tier mutual aid plans that were repeatedly identified as the 
foundation of success when addressing the response demands associated with 
surge events. Adaptive and creative concepts for coping with surge events have 
emerged through personal innovation, networked relationships and informal 
support activities. Many of these methods have developed based on lessons 
learned from the experience of the response to chaotic surge incidents. The 
collective experience of the Delphi panel has provided unique insight often 
developed during the response to expanding surge incidents.  
This thesis provides an inventory of ideas for commanders to consider. 
Informing commanders with a new level of options remains a primary goal of this 
thesis. Several respondents indicated that they would consider many of the 
concepts presented that they have never utilized. As the majority of respondents 
indicated that they were open to the adoption of concepts that would enhance 
operational effectiveness, this suggests that sharing this information can provide 
commanders with a toolbox of additional options to consider as they face 
nonroutine events. 
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Formalizing and automating support response was a theme that reiterated 
through several questions. Respondents saw a clear need to increase the depth 
of support response using both experienced Chiefs from nearby regions and 
specific experts outside of traditional response groups. Throughout the survey 
process, the need for enhanced situational awareness was presented, 
respondents support the concept of making the development of situational 
awareness a new assignment or staff function within the incident management 
system. 
Although NIMS provides operational structure, respondents endorsed the 
adoption of several concepts extracted from the German IMS system known as 
DV 100. Respondents were also open to the integration of new technologies and 
leveraging nontraditional resources, such as contact with experts as essential 
components of success when facing incidents that have progressed into the 
chaotic context. Despite the wide level of support for the adoption of technology, 
the need to provide a written guide and operational documentation as a backup 
was also expressed. 
Several responses indicated that the fire service should be exposed to 
training on nontraditional problem solving techniques from other disciplines. An 
example of this concept would be to review the strategies employed by FedEx in 
moving packages and then considering the application of these techniques to 
resource deployment in the fire service. This survey presented several innovative 
and creative ideas that have the potential to assist commanders, as they 
approach the dangers of the unfamiliar. An integrative review of the findings and 
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VII. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Coming together is a beginning, staying together is progress, and 
working together is success. 
—Henry Ford 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As an emergency incident develops, command structures are formulated 
to direct resources. During routine events, experience, intuition, patterns and 
cues are utilized to make strategic decisions. When formulating an operational 
plan during routine events, the majority of Incident Commanders function as 
experts and use perception, comprehension and projection to identify the 
potential ramifications of the unstable situation. Surge events are defined as 
emergency incidents that require resources well beyond normal operating 
capacity and become complex and chaotic. Examples of surge events include: 
accidents involving a large number of patients; the release of significant 
quantities of hazardous materials; incidents involving exponential fire spread; 
natural disasters and terrorism related events. Thankfully, disasters of this 
magnitude are rare but can be of such a magnitude that the Incident Commander 
is confronted with a unique situation that often exceeds the commander’s 
experience and ability to improvise and adapt to changing conditions. 
This thesis utilizes a Delphi survey methodology to obtain the perspective 
of experienced Incident Commanders to identify the signals that an incident is 
becoming nonroutine and unfamiliar, inventory decision-making methods during 
unfamiliar events, and identify strategies that have the potential to enhance 
decision making. This thesis identifies best practices and inventories strategic 
options that can assist Incident Commanders, as they are faced with fast moving, 
unpredictable and ever-changing crises. The knowledge obtained through this 
research will enhance the ability of Incident Commanders to make effective 
decisions when lives are most at risk. 
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This thesis addresses the research questions: “As emergency incidents 
expand toward the chaotic context, what symptoms, patterns and cues exist to 
indicate that a different method of decision making is necessary?” and “What 
strategies can be utilized to enhance decision making during the initial response 
to chaotic surge incidents?”  Secondary questions guiding the research include: 
• How are decisions made during the initial response to asymmetric 
incidents? 
• As emergency incidents expand toward the chaotic context, what 
signals indicate that an event is becoming nonroutine, unfamiliar 
and chaotic and which of these signals is the most important? 
• What strategies can be utilized to enhance decision making during 
the initial response to chaotic surge incidents? 
• How important is information management and situational 
awareness during the response to surge events? 
• What decision aids can enhance confidence and capacity on the 
incident scene? 
• How can NIMS be adjusted to be more effective? 
• How can second and third tier mutual aid be improved? 
• How can the value of informal support networks be strengthened? 
• What comparative command practices should be considered for 
adoption in the United States? 
• What innovative and creative ideas to enhance decision making 
during the initial response to surge events should be considered? 
This study used a Delphi survey to illicit responses from CFOs who are 
either graduates of the National Fire Academies (NFA) Executive Fire Officer 
Program (EFOP) or participants in the Massachusetts Fire Incident Reporting 
System (MFIRS). The Delphi survey included both quantitative and qualitative 
questions. Quantitative questions sought the identification of statistical 
information and rated of the importance of signals and the frequency of 
command staff assignments. Qualitative questions included requests to identify 
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important signals, inventoried adaptive strategies and considered options to 
manage information. Data has been analyzed and summarized to address each 
of the research questions listed above.  
This chapter presents the Delphi survey results, relates these results to 
the background and context of the problem and literature on decision making 
during emergent events, and proposes recommendations. This study began by 
reviewing the background of command decision making at asymmetric incidents 
and reviewing the literature on decision-making methodologies, collaboration, 
and geospatial technologies. This analysis informed the development of survey 
questions.  
A three round Delphi survey was created and distributed to 32 CFOs, as 
described in Chapter VI. The first round questions were framed to identify signals 
that indicate that an emergency is moving beyond the expected and becoming 
unpredictable, unfamiliar or chaotic and to identify the adaptive decision-making 
methodologies used in these situations. The second round of the Delphi survey 
was informed by the results of the first. It concentrated on ranking the relative 
importance of signals identified in round one and listing concepts that would 
improve strategic decision making during the initial response to surge incidents. 
The third round of the Delphi survey, built on the results of the first two rounds. It 
consisted of questions that addressed three broad categories including the 
identification of concepts that contribute to value and/or the effectiveness of 
operations, identifying the frequency that identified themes are utilized, and 
gauging the receptivity to implementation of IMS components from other models.  
The research question findings are presented below, followed by short 
and long-term recommendations for action and directions for future research in 
the area of command decision- making. 
The major findings from this study were: 
• Decision making during emergency operations relies on both 
situational and personal factors. On the personal level, experience, 
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patterns and cues form the basis for decisions. Situational factors 
include the extent of situational awareness, resource availability, 
command capability and the capacity for collaboration. In this 
context the seasoned expert in routine situations can transition to a 
novice when faced with unfamiliar incidents that often exist in the 
chaotic context. 
• This project identified 18 themes that signal the transition from the 
routine toward the unfamiliar. Examples of dominant themes 
include: compromised safety on the incident scene, a lack of 
sufficient information or situational awareness, strained command 
structure, lack of progress controlling the situation and a lack of 
sufficient resources to match the scope and magnitude of the 
incident. The presence of these themes can inform ICs that an 
incident is becoming emergent. This knowledge can produce an 
anticipatory strategy that has the potential harness a higher level of 
situational awareness and produce a more effective response 
effort. 
• A variety of strategies to deal with the unexpected exist within the 
complex adaptive IMS system. This thesis created an inventory of 
possible strategies that can broaden the preparatory and response 
based options of ICs. The Delphi survey process indicated that 
responders have a high receptivity to adopting concepts that they 
have not previously utilized.  
• Surge events present unanticipated conditions and problems 
requiring creativity, collaboration and innovation while demanding 
the rapid delivery of services under adverse conditions. 
• There is a tradeoff between command and control required for 
mobilization and then collaboration, coordination and 
communication necessary to craft an appropriate response to surge 
incidents. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION FINDINGS 
This section provides the findings of the study’s research questions. A 
secondary question that developed through the review of literature is presented 
first, followed by findings to the overarching research questions “As emergency 
incidents expand toward the chaotic context, what symptoms, patterns and 
cues exist to indicate that a different method of decision making is 
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necessary?” And “What strategies can be utilized to enhance decision 
making during the initial response to chaotic surge incidents?” 
• How are decisions made during the initial response to asymmetric 
incidents? 
The high-risk, time-sensitive environment of emergency response requires 
commanders to take immediate action. Typically, commanders use a naturalistic 
decision-making process that harnesses the lens of previous experience as a 
foundation for action. 125 As an incident evolves, experienced experts use the 
concept of rapid cognition to filter extraneous information and zoom in on aspects 
of the situation that really matter.126 Recognition Primed Decision-making (RPD) 
allows the expert to identify the presence or absence of familiar patterns and 
cues and then use this comparative information as a foundation for action.  
The literature shows that novel events often exist within the chaotic 
context of the Cynefin Framework. 127  First responders confront the challenge of 
responding to unique and often unfamiliar events with a lack of both exposure 
and experience. 128  In the absence of experience, the expert who is well versed 
in dealing with the routine can transform into a novice when dealing with the 
unexpected. Novices tend to react and often revert to the comfort of applying 
familiar strategies to unfamiliar events. This principle was demonstrated within 
the research as respondents identified symptoms relating to their inability to use 
expertise to manage these unique situations. Examples of these symptoms 
include: the presence of a strained command structure, personnel that are 
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overwhelmed, lack of sufficient information, commanders that are managed by 
the incident, loss of responder composure, and a deterioration in teamwork. 
An extreme event can produce unforeseen problems and conditions that 
require the application of creativity, improvisation and adaptability. As the intense 
psychological pressure of the response to novel events often shuts down the part 
of the brain responsible for creative and innovative thought, commanders must 
balance the structure and rigidity of NIMS with the agility needed to adapt and 
collaborate when facing the unexpected.129  
• As emergency incidents expand toward the chaotic context, what 
signals indicate that an event is becoming nonroutine, unfamiliar 
and chaotic and which of these signals is the most important? 
This study sought to identify signals that an incident is or has transitioned 
toward the nonroutine. Delphi panel participants were asked to identify the 
signals that an emergency is moving beyond the expected and becoming 
unpredictable, unfamiliar or chaotic. The survey process identified 18 themes that 
ranked as either very important or somewhat important. These themes are listed 
below: 
• Safety compromise (loss of accountability, mayday, 
victim/firefighter injury) 
• Lack of progress (situation escalates, unable to complete 
assignments) 
• Strained command structure (lack of structure, unable to manage 
roles) 
• Communications strain/breakdown (interoperability, radio system 
overload) 
• Lack of sufficient information (situational analysis) 
• High risk decisions (risk based analysis) 
                                            
129 Jeff Weiss and Jonathan Hughes, "Want Collaboration? Accept-and Actively Manage-
Conflict." Harvard Business Review 83, no. 3 (March, 2005): 93–101.  
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• Insufficient resources (loss of span of control) 
• Lack of teamwork (freelancing) 
• Overwhelmed (anxiety or confusion) 
• Unfamiliar / unexpected occurrences (odd requests, lack of similar 
experience, reporting volume not matching) 
• Managed by the incident (reactive nature emerges) 
• Command inundated with information (external concerns, requests 
for information) 
• Multiple decision points/priorities (multiple operational 
sites/incidents) 
• Loss of responder composure (paralysis, frustration, errors) 
• Complex operations/structure (need to collaborate) 
• Need to redeploy resources (defensive posture) 
• Sense of urgency (intuition, voice modulation) 
• Time expectations exceeded 
The survey process further refined this consensus-based inventory of 
signals to identify the five most important themes. The five most important 
signals include; safety compromise, the lack of sufficient information or 
situational awareness, strained command structure, lack of progress mitigating 
the incident, and insufficient resources. These signals provide a series of 
indicators that can inform Incident Commanders when an incident is becoming 
emergent. Additional research should be conducted to further explore the 
concept of signal recognition, as this inventory is not presented as an exhaustive 
list.  
The absence of expected signals was another concept explored through 
this research. Respondents identified that the absence of three expected signals 
would indicate the emergence of an unfamiliar situation. These missing signals 
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include the absence of expected incident progression, a lack of critical 
communications, and the lack of engagement of crews indicating that personnel 
do not know what actions they should take. 
A lack of knowledge and recognition of the importance of these signals 
can lead to disaster. The Delphi process indicates that ICs share only a minimal 
level of knowledge pertaining to these signals. Providing ICs with an inventory of 
these signals provides a point of reference and a level of knowledge that may 
enhance decision making during the response to surge events. 
• What strategies can be utilized to enhance decision making during 
the initial response to chaotic surge incidents? 
The literature indicates that creativity; adaption and improvisation are 
essential aspects of success when confronting novel surge events.130  Decision 
making in complex environments requires a high level of situational knowledge, 
information sharing and collaboration. Collaborative capacity is the collective 
ability of a networked team to collect, synthesize and prioritize information 
essential to managing events within the unordered context of the Cynefin 
Framework.131  Partnerships, including multi-agency and public-private 
coalitions, are a growing reality and an adaptive way to face the growing 
complexity of emergent threats.132  
When facing unfamiliar and unpredictable incidents, the majority of survey 
respondents indicated they would alter their decision-making strategies. Altered 
strategies included increasing collaboration by seeking the opinion of experts or 
those with experience, assigning additional personnel to coordinate activity as  
 
                                            
130 John R. Harrald, "Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response." 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604, no. 1 (March, 2006): 
256–272. 
131 Snowden, A Leader's Framework, 68–76. 
132 Robert Klitgaard and Gregory F. Treverton, Assessing Partnerships: New Forms of 
Collaboration. Washington, DC: IBM Endowment for the The Business of Government, 2003. 
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command functions expand, moving toward a defensive strategy that ensures the 
safety of responders, verifying information, and maintaining a risk vs. gain 
approach. 
This thesis developed an inventory of possible strategies that can be 
employed to confront asymmetric situations. Informing commanders of these 
concepts provides a range of tools that can be considered as incidents become 
chaotic or nonroutine. Specifically, strategies that should be considered to match 
the scope and magnitude of chaotic events include the following: 
• Preplan, anticipation of probable events; activation of plans 
• Prioritize actions toward immediate needs (deployment of limited 
resources, focus on achievable goals) 
• Call for additional resources early (more than needed) 
• Expand ICS Structure, delegate responsibilities, empower 
personnel 
• Break the incident into manageable segments; adjust the length of 
operational periods 
• Construct options (multiple game plans) 
• Constantly seek updated situational awareness 
• Focus on macro view 
• Integrate external agencies—nontraditional roles 
• Develop communications structure to match the incident 
• Use informal support of local chief officers  
• Confer with colleagues 
• Remain calm—influence on others 
• Establish time checks from dispatch center 
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Other tactical actions include consideration of actions that will enhance 
operational capacity or reduce distraction and interference on the incident scene. 
These ideas include the assignment of an aide to assist the IC, developing 
written plans and checklists to track activity, moving the command post away 
from the incident site, conducting regular briefing sessions for first responders, 
limiting radio traffic, verifying the credibility of information, and assigning a Public 
Information Officer (PIO) to manage press briefings away from the command 
post. Respondents indicated a high level of potential adoption of strategic options 
they had not previous considered. These command methods provide an arsenal 
of strategies that can be considered as commanders face the unfamiliar. 
Although this strategic inventory can provide the IC with a series of tools to 
consider, these are not a singular solution as a high level of knowledge, skill and 
ability is essential to match the these options to the scope and magnitude of the 
asymmetric incident.  
The research process revealed the most immediate assistance in 
confronting surge events resides on the regional level or second tier of the 
mutual aid system. The regional level is composed of informal interagency 
associations that often self-organize to optimize services. Given the informal 
nature of these associations, programmatic action is based on a series of 
situational and personal factors. As personal factors include personalities and 
relationships, the absence of consensus can produce a substantive barrier that 
can stifle change. Regional solutions are attractive based on proximity, resource 
depth and the propensity for command officers to self-organize through regional 
associations. Regional assets include the ability to access resources through 
mutual-aid plans, the relationship-based response of local CFOs to support 
command, and the integration of external agencies. Simulation-based training, 
and training on the implementation of response plans, was discussed as a critical 
success factor that complements operations at the regional level. 
• How important is information management and situational 
awareness during the response to surge events 
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Decision making in the high stress environment of emergency response is 
subject to time pressure, significant uncertainty, and life safety concerns. 
Considering these factors, a high level of situational awareness is directly linked 
to operational success.133 Situational awareness is the art of understanding your 
surroundings while developing perception, comprehension and projection. 
Situational awareness empowers the IC to make sense of a situation and 
anticipate shifting conditions.134 Multiple agencies are frequently involved in the 
response to complex incidents, a potentially dangerous consequence is that 
critical information is “Stovepiped” or constrained by organizational boundaries 
based on organizational culture and a lack of collaboration.135  
Often, the level of information directed toward the IC during a crisis is 
overwhelming. Survey respondents were asked how they filter and manage the 
vast amount of information inherent to emergency operations. These information 
management concepts have the potential to expand the options considered by 
commanders, as they face emergent incidents. These ideas are listed below: 
• Expand ICS Structure, delegate responsibilities, empower 
personnel 
• Utilize an aide, liaison, scribe, communications specialist 
• Document plans, checklists 
• Break incident into manageable segments 
• Use informal support of local chief officers  
• Security, isolation of command post 
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135 Ibid., 16. 
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• Conduct regular internal briefing sessions 
• Confirm credibility of information 
• Assign public information officer – conduct press briefings away 
from the command post 
• What decision aids can enhance confidence and capacity on the 
incident scene? 
Chaotic events tend to increase the level of communication and enhance 
cohesion based on shared interdependence. Decision aids can enhance the 
development of a high level of situational analysis by organizing data, building a 
common vision, and filtering information to promote effective decision making. 
Respondents were asked to identify decision aids that would enhance both the 
confidence and capacity of decision making during asymmetric events. The 
development of aerial reconnaissance was the top selection, as this technology 
offers a macro perspective of evolving conditions that are often elusive on the 
incident scene. Using sensors embedded with crews operating in remote areas 
provides a micro perspective of the conditions and serves as a mechanism to 
evaluate conditions in an area of operation and a means to enhance the safety of 
operating personnel. These technologies have the potential to enhance 
operations and enhance decision making as incidents expand into the chaotic 
context. 
The development of job aids can enhance decision making provided that 
common expectations have been set through training. Presently most fire service 
organizations use a number of different and often incompatible job aids. To be 
effective in a multiagency/multidiscipline response consistent job aids need to be 
employed as the foundation of a higher level of shared knowledge. 
The value of job aids was tempered by perceived cost relative to 
perceived benefit. This cost benefit criteria dramatically changed the results and 
pushed the top priority for the development of job aids away from costly 
nontraditional technologies such as aerial reconnaissance. When considering the 
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priority of investment, respondents ranked training, automated response of 
support personnel, computerized checklists, and systems that track the location 
of firefighters as top investment priorities. Other ideas for decision aids include 
the development of written guides as a backup in case of the technological 
failure, access to experts, increased exercises, and increased networking 
opportunities. 
• How can NIMS be adjusted to be more effective? 
Harrald indicates that expertise is not a singular solution, as a balance of 
both agility and discipline are required to successfully mitigate emergency 
incidents. Agility includes the ability to innovate through NIMS, which is typically 
considered to be a closed and rigid system.136 Surge events produce unforeseen 
problems and conditions requiring adaption, improvisation and creativity to 
deliver effective services under extreme conditions. 
A slight majority of survey respondents felt that NIMS is an optimal IMS 
model, while others felt it could be improved. Proponents indicated that NIMS is a 
standard tool that is utilized across America, and this standardization generates a 
common level of knowledge and comprehension when dealing with agencies that 
rarely work together. Others felt that NIMS is a scalable system that provides 
structure, and they believe that NIMS breaks the incident into manageable pieces 
while ensuring resource control and information flow. However, just under half of 
the respondents that felt NIMS is not the optimal model viewed NIMS as a rigid 
system that is not well suited for all incidents. 
NIMS is the universal IMS system utilized in the U.S. Although changes to 
NIMS can produce agility, caution needs to be exercised to avoid the 
development of divergent systems. Emphasis should be placed on the optimizing 
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response at the regional level and then introducing best practices into NIMS to 
promote broad adoption of these best practices. 
• How can second and third tier mutual aid be improved? 
The crux of developing a response that matches the scope and intensity of 
surge events lies within the ability to engage the resources organized through 
second (regional) and third (state) tier mutual-aid plans. The literature indicates 
that this interdependence creates a shared purpose and the determination of a 
joint mission. Survey respondents provided a series of responses relative to how 
best to improve the effectiveness of these mutual-aid plans. Concepts identified 
focused on increasing training and simulations, building awareness of existing 
plans, and providing a resource and inventory status system. Respondents 
indicated that a system deficit is the relative infrequency of use. The automation 
of response was a dominant research theme that would enhance operational 
capability by increasing familiarity with second and third tier systems based on a 
higher level of utilization.  
The Federalist principles prevalent within the U.S. provide a strong level of 
local autonomy. Automation reduces some of that autonomy and introduces 
regional response assets. Responders need to focus on supporting the local IC 
and be careful not to produce a threatening environment by taking actions that 
would disturb the local IC. 
• How can the value of informal support networks be strengthened? 
Survey responses consistently demonstrated that an informal and often 
relationship-based support from local CFOs was a critical aspect of developing 
an effective response to surge events. Based on proximity, this second level of 
command resources is the most immediate support that is available. Social 
aspects, such as the power of relationships and personalities, should not be 
underestimated as the foundation of collaboration. Hocevar et al. noted that the 
personal aspects of collaboration are often attained through a personal touch, a 
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handshake and a smile.137  The literature indicates that the ability to leverage 
collaboration is built on trust, respect, dependability, and previous relationships. 
Interdependence often leads to the formation of emergent teams. A collaborative 
approach creates an environment that supports intelligent improvisation, which 
may lead to new strategic options and solutions.138 
Respondents provided insight into the best methods to enhance the value 
of the informal response of CFOs. This guidance includes formalizing response 
plans to include the automated activation of a support team of local CFOs, 
allowing participants to opt in rather than being forced to respond or accept 
assistance, providing role specific training, creating documentation relative to 
expectations, and developing opportunities to broaden networking relationships. 
Informal support was viewed by the Delphi panel as the backbone of 
success during the first operational period of surge events. The relationships 
formed through informal support networks are fragile. Therefore, responders 
need to focus on customer service as they work for the local IC. The value of 
relationships should not be underestimated as a single negative experience can 
produce regional ramifications.  
• What comparative command practices should be considered for 
adoption in the United States? 
Often, the opportunity for productive change comes from beyond our own 
lens of experience. This study considered the perspective and practices utilized 
within the German IMS system DV 100.139  This comparative evaluation 
unearthed ten concepts that have the potential to alter NIMS in an effort to 
enhance effectiveness and efficiency. Respondents indicated a high level of 
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interest in adopting eight of the ten concepts presented. Practices to consider 
include reorganizing staff functions to better match the needs of an event, 
focusing on the importance of situational awareness, development of support 
teams, development of technology to assist in command functions, creation of 
nontraditional partnerships, and the automation of the response of support 
resources. 
These concepts have the potential to enhance response efforts and 
produce a more agile IMS. The agility produced needs to be slowly developed 
and balanced with the discipline and structure of NIMS. Aspects of comparative 
analysis produce opportunities that can become liabilities if not properly 
implemented. 
• What innovative and creative ideas to enhance decision making 
during the initial response to surge events should be considered? 
Innovation and creativity leads to the adaptive ability to solve unfamiliar 
problems. Respondents presented two new ideas. First, providing training to 
commanders in the art of nontraditional problem solving received the highest 
level of respondent interest. This suggests a willingness to look to other 
disciplines for ideas that could be applied on the emergency scene.  
As an example, FedEx is a leader in the logistics of moving packages in a 
timely and efficient manner. One strategy employed by FedEx is the use of hubs 
where packages are gathered and then sorted for bulk delivery. This business 
practice optimizes efficiency and may have applications in the management of 
large volumes of patients in need of medical transport to appropriate facilities that 
often occurs during the response to Mass Casualty Incidents (MCIs).  
Venturing beyond traditional learning venues can provide new 
perspective. These ideas need to be carefully considered as a change can often 
produce second and third level effects. Reflecting on the example above, using 
FedEx’s logistical expertise should not be pursued, if the secondary effect of 
decreased patient care would result. 
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Second, developing and publishing a review of lessons learned at novel 
events could continue the inventory of knowledge initiated by this thesis. This 
strategy provides commanders with an inventory of strategic options that could 
prove helpful, as they face the unfamiliar landscape of asymmetric incidents. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF INCIDENT CONTROL STRATEGIES 
Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or 
present are certain to miss the future. 
–President John F. Kennedy 
Leaders are architects, assimilators, and facilitators of strategic change. 
Implementation occurs when an individual or group puts an innovation to use. 
This involves a process that considers collaboration, consensus and culture and 
then utilizes networked relationships to make a decision relative to the best path. 
Implementation is the overt behavior that puts ideas into practice.140 
This thesis identifies several ideas that if broadly adopted could enhance 
decision making during the first operational period of surge events. These ideas 
are disruptive, as they represent substantive change; and as such, the approach 
to implementation is a critical success factor that constitutes the difference 
between considering a theory and producing tangible results. As an example, the 
Delphi panel agreed that aerial reconnaissance was a job aide that could 
enhance situational awareness. If this concept was implemented without both 
consensus and appropriate training, it could be viewed as a threat to autonomy 
that would create a reaction that would impede adoption. 
The unique aspects of the nature of informal associations that are the key 
to successful consideration and adoption of change make the approach to 
implementation a critical success factor. Regional associations have developed 
as a tool for synergy and adaption to the ever-changing environment of the public 
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sector. As commanders self-organize on a regional level, these associations form 
the backbone of fire service collaboration in the United States. 
Complex systems are comprised of groups of adaptive agents whose 
interactions result in complex nonlinear dynamics, the results of which produce 
emergent phenomena.141 The hallmark of these complex adaptive systems is 
emergence and the informal cultural power to lead change. 
Meadows indicates that we live in a world of complex interconnected 
systems.142  Evolving collaboration through regional entities stands as an 
example of the interconnected nature of the American Fire Service. Change 
involves an attempt to alter the current way of thinking and acting by the 
organization’s membership; this enables groups to take advantage of 
opportunities to cope with environmental threats. Management by Values (MBV) 
is a strategic leadership tool that can help redesign organizational culture and 
prepare them for the future 143 Shared beliefs and values provide an important 
key to understanding and facilitating human conduct in groups. Values are 
structures of thought that encompass complex ideas about the reality desired by 
people. Values have the capacity to transcend perception of what exists and 
conceptualize a positive vision of the future. The conception of a positive future 
serves as the foundation of change.144 
Everett Rogers developed the innovation life cycle that starts with the 
impetus for change being disruption. As the environment is disrupted, 
innovations are considered and adopted, as outlined in Figure 8. Once adopted, 
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these changes eventually become routinized and slowly blend into the tradition 
and culture of the organization. This cycle is detailed below: 
 
Figure 8.   Everett Rogers Innovation Life Cycle (From Everett Roger Diffusion of 
Innovations 2003) 
As organizations struggle to make sense of changing internal and external 
environments culture is a key factor in identifying the obstacles to implementing 
innovation. Organizational culture is associated with collective cognition and 
shared beliefs; these are reflected in the traditions, habits, stories, and symbols 
of the group.145   
These shared beliefs encourage consistency in organizational behavior 
and produces a predictable resistance to change demonstrated in Figure 9. 
Adoption of change is a process of managing risk.146   Change moves people 
and organizations beyond the comfort of the status quo into the realm of the 
unknown, this disruption is unsettling and causes personal reactions that range 
from enthusiasm to combativeness. Management of these reactions and 
knowledge of the process of innovation adoption is essential to the successful 
implementation of strategic change. Everett Rogers developed the adoption 
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curve in 1995. This curve explains how change progresses slowly at first through 
the actions of innovators. Social influence then contributes to a wider adoption 
that gains momentum as others move toward adoption. Despite this domino 
effect, some laggards continue to resist as they cling to the status quo of the 
past. This process has been outlined in Figure 9:  
 
Figure 9.   Everett Rogers 1995 Adoption Curve (From Everett Rogers Diffusion 
of Innovations, 2003) 
Managers need to address the cultural context as a mechanism to 
produce and sustain strategic change.147  If culture defaults to the status quo, 
this bias can blind managers to changing external conditions, as they tend to 
stick with beliefs that have worked in the past.148  
Consensus is another key aspect of implementation; collective agreement 
enables one to cope with uncertainty and rapid change.149  Consensus building 
is a way to search for feasible strategies for dealing with conflict. Stakeholders 
with a variety of interests often come together to dialogue about policy issues or 
common concerns. Collaboration can break logjams and incorporate many 
interests producing mutual gain and the potential of higher levels of 
performance.150  
                                            
147 G. Johnson, "Managing Strategic Change—Strategy, Culture and Action." Long Range 
Planning 25, no. 1 (1992): 28-36.  
148 Mintzberg, et al., Strategy Safari. 
149 Judith Eleanor Innes and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to 
Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy, edited by . Translated by , edited by . Milton Park, 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. 
150 Ibid.  
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Consensus building has emerged as an important method of deliberation 
that has produced agreements, innovations, social policy, and intellectual capital 
among previously warring stakeholders.151  Consensus building and other forms 
of collaborative planning can help to resolve social and political fragmentation, 
shared power and conflicting values. Collaboration is not only about producing 
agreement but also about experimentation.152  Consensus can establish new or 
stronger personal and professional relationships and build trust that facilitates 
joint communication and problem solving. Through an atmosphere of trust, 
Consensus can lead to a higher level of learning and creativity.  
Implementation is a complex and evolving process that changes as the 
organization overcomes challenges. Through the shared experience of building 
consensus, facts are explored and a shared reality is created. This shared reality 
becomes the basis for action and ultimately leads toward implementation. 
This thesis has drawn on the wisdom of experienced ICs to identify 
innovations and best practices that, if adopted, more broadly would enhance the 
effectiveness of operations during the first operational period of surge events. 
Implementation of these concepts is the key to making a substantive difference 
on the incident scene. As change is often a difficult and transformative process, 
consideration needs to be given to how to move the ideas generated through this 
research into action. Emergency response is a complex and interconnected 
system that links intra and interdisciplinary response agencies with NGOs to 
optimize response efforts and maximize public value. This complex environment 
requires that innovation be paced to match the tolerance of these interconnected 
relationships. 
The Delphi panel identified regional associations as the workhorse of 
change that could disrupt the environment and ultimately influence the practices 
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associated with NIMS. As an example, many of the survey respondents indicated 
that the informal support offered by local CFOs is the first line of command 
support available. The majority of Delphi participants reached consensus that this 
level of support should be formalized and automated. As this support is often 
relationship-based, change must be based on regional consensus. Rushing into 
this process or ignoring the need for collaboration would create an innovative 
disruption destine for failure. Considering the adoption process and the need to 
strategize the implementation of the concepts identified in this thesis is the 
cornerstone of adoption. 
D. ITEMS FOR ACTION / IMPLEMENTATION AND CHALLENGES 
The response to complex and chaotic events remains a difficult task. The 
purpose of this thesis was to provide ideas that can be utilized by ICs as the face 
the challenges of response to asymmetric surge events. The action items 
identified below were developed from the research findings. 
1. Short-term Proposals and Considerations 
Enhancing decision making during the first operational period of surge 
events is centered on the optimization of local and regional resources that are in 
proximity to be rapidly deployed. This observation creates an opportunity for 
action that can produce tangible results through strengthening collaborative 
efforts. Augmenting a commander’s strategic inventory has the potential to create 
a vision of a shared approach to the unique problems created by surge incidents. 
Specifically, the following actions should be considered at the regional 
level: 
• Develop an educational component that summarizes the findings of 
this study to be presented at regional meetings of CFOs as a 
means to generate discussion; 
• Provide CFOs with an inventory of the strategic concepts presented 
within this thesis; 
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• Identify the action items that are easily accomplished as a means to 
create forward momentum; 
• Appoint a focus group to make recommendations for action; 
• Pursue actions based on a consensus process; 
• Utilize short-term success as a springboard to continue to develop 
strategies that enhance decision making during the first operational 
period of surge events. 
2. Long-term Proposals and Considerations 
In the long term, regional response concepts should be augmented by a 
greater effort to annunciate lessons learned from the response to surge events 
and project best practices through state and national level training opportunities. 
Additional actions should focus on the update of NIMS and continued 
development of interagency coordination systems. Specific recommendations 
follow: 
• Identify examples of best practices in developing response 
resilience; 
• Provide commanders with a periodic training opportunity that 
focuses on the challenges and stressors associated with command; 
• Publish information that outline lessons learned; 
• Develop a monthly column in a respected fire service periodical that 
focuses on broadening one’s lens of experience based on lessons 
learned from disaster response; 
• Work with the USFA to develop interactive simulations that focus 
on strategic command decision making; 
• Develop nontraditional problem solving training that can be applied 
to public safety operations; 
• Revise NIMS to include the flexibility to embrace creativity, 
innovation and improvisation during the response to nonroutine 
situations. 
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Moving theory into practice is a challenging and methodical process that 
needs to be guided by leadership. Meta-leaders are those individuals whose 
scope of thinking, influence, and accomplishment extends far beyond their formal 
or expected bounds of authority. The following quote highlights the need for 
leaders to inspire others: 
If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more 
and become more, you are a leader. 
—John Quincy Adams 
These individuals have the unique capacity to generate widespread 
cohesive action that expands their domain of influence and leverage.153  The 
critical interdependence of crisis situations allows extraordinary meta-leaders to 
emerge. Marked by strength of character and keen analytic skill, these unique 
leaders have the ability to lead, follow and productively engage others. These 
qualities forge an impact and level of collaboration not otherwise attained.154  
Many of these qualities were demonstrated by the quality of information collected 
from the experienced leaders that participated in the Delphi survey process. 
Although each participant brought a unique perspective to the research, the 
development of consensus is a reflection of the leadership perspectives and 
capabilities of the respondents. 
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research efforts have the opportunity to expand the inventory of 
potential command strategies and focus on integration of this knowledge into the 
training of commanders. Through these efforts, adaptive decision making, 
improved situational awareness, and collaborative capacity can be expanded and 
then harnessed as the foundation of problem solving during the response to 
emergent incidents. The literature reveals that four research gaps exist and the 
                                            
153 Leonard J. Marcus et al., The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership (Cambridge, MA: 
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154 Ibid., 24. 
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opportunity to focus on transitional aspects of command remains vastly 
underexplored. The areas of opportunity are listed below: 
1. Evaluation of interdisciplinary approaches to management of 
resources during chaotic events in an effort to develop 
multidiscipline best practices. 
 
2. Identification of the social aspects that impact command decision 
making. 
 
3. Research on the transition of incidents from complex to chaotic 
contexts. 
 
4. Research concerning the potential for individuals to transition from 
experts to novices when facing chaotic and unimagined events.   
 
Additional research opportunities also exist in evaluating the impact of 
social identity on emergency response and command decision making. Further 
research could explore barriers to implementation, and the development of 
interagency coordination strategies when groups do not have the opportunities to 
form a relationship prior to being immersed in an event. This thesis also 
unearthed the presence of significant stress placed on commanders during the 
response to asymmetric events. Although significant research exists on the topic 
of posttraumatic stress disorder, little research considers the unique aspects of 
the stress placed on Incident Commanders during these critical events. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Response to unfamiliar surge events is a complex process that requires 
the cooperation of stakeholders. Enhancing decision making during the initial 
response to surge events will require the collaboration of multiple agencies and 
an adaptive approach to decision making by ICs. Response operations are a 
complex adaptive system that requires creativity thinking, collaboration, 
improvisation, and leadership. This thesis examines the methodology of 
command decision making and provides ideas that can enhance the knowledge, 
skill and ability of ICs.  
 140 
Facing unfamiliar surge events challenges even the most experienced 
commanders. These incidents place a unique level of responsibility and stress on 
the IC. In these critical situations, where high-risk decisions abound, identifying 
the signals that an incidents becoming emergent and providing an inventory of 
strategic options creates the tools necessary to enhance decision making. 
Communication of best practices remains a challenge, as this thesis 
demonstrates that even among seasoned experts a variety of exceptional ideas 
have been produced through the Delphi process. In absence of this process, 
many of these ideas would remain contained within a small group of 
respondents. 
The recommendations of this thesis are focused on strategies that would 
enhance decision making during the first operational period of surge events. 
These ideas need to be considered through a stakeholder driven process. 
Recommendations include a series of strategically paced initiatives that 
encompass the following:  
• Strengthen the training of ICs; 
• Inform ICs of signals of chaotic incident transition;  
• Provide an inventory of strategic options; 
• Formalize incident support activities; 
• Automate the response of support teams;  
• Enhance nontraditional collaboration; 
• Provide a stronger emphasis on the value of situational analysis; 
• Provide education in nontraditional problem solving methods; 
• Development of a quick action guide for ICs to utilize during the 





Adoption of these ideas and innovations would challenge the status quo 
and provide a framework for consensus-based change. Specifically, 
implementation of the recommendations listed above has the potential to 
produce the following results: 
• Documents the need for on-going command education; 
• Enhances the knowledge base and decision-making framework of 
ICs; 
• Provides a focus on the benefit of learning from the experience of 
other commanders; 
• Informs ICS of the signals of chaotic incident transition; 
• Provides a series of knowledge based resources built through the 
consensus of the Delphi panel; 
• Enhances the level of incident support provided during the first 
operational period of surge events; 
• Formalizes and automates support activities. 
Through the information provided by this research process, the goal of this 
thesis has been reached. Decision making during the initial response to surge 
events will continue to challenge ICs with chaotic situations marked by time 
pressure, the need for immediate action and a great degree of uncertainty. As 
commanders engage the chaos prevalent in the heat of battle, the knowledge 
collected through this thesis can provide a foundation for leading more effective 
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APPENDIX A. QUICK ACTON FIELD OPERATIONS GUIDE 
NORTHAMPTON FIRE DEPARTMENT 
 
 
UNFAMILIAR EVENT QUICK ACTION GUIDE 
 








Signs of Incident Transformation 
 Safety compromise (loss of accountability, mayday, 
victim/firefighter injury) 
 Lack of progress (situation escalates, unable to complete 
assignments) 
 Strained command structure (lack of structure, unable to 
manage roles) 
 Communications strain/breakdown (interoperability, radio 
system overload) 
 Lack of sufficient information (situational analysis) 
 High risk decisions (risk based analysis) 
 Insufficient resources (loss of span of control) 
 Lack of teamwork (freelancing) 
 Overwhelmed (anxiety or confusion) 
 Unfamiliar / unexpected occurrences (odd requests, lack of 
similar experience, reporting volume not matching) 
 Managed by the incident (reactive nature emerges) 
 Command inundated with information (external concerns, 
requests for information) 
 Multiple decision points/priorities (multiple operational 
sites/incidents) 
 Loss of responder composure (paralysis, frustration, errors) 
 Complex operations/structure (need to collaborate) 
 Need to redeploy resources (defensive posture) 
 Sense of urgency (intuition, voice modulation) 
 Time expectations exceeded 
Shading indicates signal rated as Urgent 
Shading indicates signal rated as extremely important 
 
 144 









Command Strategies to Consider 
 Expand ICS structure, delegate responsibilities, empower 
personnel 
 Utilize an aide 
 Assign a scribe 
 Assign a Liaison Officer 
 Assign a Safety Officer 
 Assign a Public Information officer (PIO) 
 Assign a communications specialist (COMM L) 
 Write down plans, complete checklists 
 Develop a Unified Command Structure 
 Utilize Command Staff or Additional Chief Officers from the 
Local Area 
 Appoint a Deputy Incident Commander 
 Appoint a Deputy Operations Officer 
 Assign personnel to the Logistics Section 
 Assign personnel to the Planning section 
 Assign personnel to the Finance Section 
 Request more resources than the initial assessment indicates 
 Break the incident into manageable segments 
 Constantly seek updated situational awareness 
 Confer with experienced colleagues that are not on the incident 
scene 
 Construct options (multiple game plans) 
 Integrate nongovernmental personnel (e.g, local experts, 
private sector resources 
 Adjust the length of operational periods 
 Automate notification of elapsed time through your dispatch 
center 
 Implement security at the command post 
 Move the command post away from the incident scene 
 Conduct regular internal briefing sessions 
 Limit radio traffic to critical communications 
 Verify the credibility of information 
 Assign a Public Information officer (PIO) 














Creative Ideas to Cope with Unfamiliar Events 
 Training in nontraditional problem solving methods 
 Increased training and exercises 
 Structured review of lessons learned from surge 
incidents 
 Create support teams 
 Assign an aide to command positions 
 Computerized job aides 
 Bottom up ICS focus 
 Build expanded relationships 
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APPENDIX D. DELPHI SURVEY DATA 
Note: Page numbers on the Survey Monkey data have random blank 
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